LOOKING INTO THE MICROCOSM
FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE QUALITY OF
GRAHAM POWER'S LEADERSHIP.
"7: The recommendations from the initial visit have been acted upon, some within a very short period following delivery of the initial report. The States of Jersey Police are to be commended for their positive reception of the report and for their extremely prompt response in implementing the recommendations."
There is no Substitute for Facts.
Yet the Jersey Oligarchy has Produced None.
When time and circumstances used to permit, I would occasionally write about the various propaganda and spin-doctoring devices routinely used by the powerful and the rich. The best, all-encompassing term I have discovered to describe such activity being "opinion-management".
We all want to 'manage the opinions' of other people – be they friends, family, work-colleagues, customers, clients, businesses, voters, investors - the list is endless.
And we – in turn – regardless of whether we care to admit it, have our opinions 'managed' by the efforts of others.
It isn't the purpose of this post to delve into such a broad and deep subject at length; another day, perhaps?
But a quick consideration of one or two of the key factors in 'opinion-management' does help to contextualise the document I reproduce below – the second report by the Association of Chief Police Officers.
Managing public opinion – manipulating a large swath of people into believing what you want them to believe, and thinking the way you want them to think – is a dramatically easier task – if you have big money behind you. Big money, in the sense that you can 'own' – in all senses of the word – a large part of the mass-media. If you happen to possess such huge economic power, you can ensure that your 'message' – your propaganda – is repeated at length, and in high-profile – and in a manner that is consistent across several media outlets.
You will have succeeded in "framing" the debate in such a way as to have "normalised" the 'opinion' you wish the average person to hold.
That 'opinion' you will have imparted to many people could be right – or wrong – or somewhere in between. The fact remains, you will have succeeded in your objective of 'managing' public opinion.
And once public opinion is established in that way – is "framed" – is normalised – anyone who wishes to change that public opinion faces a dramatically difficult task. Especially if they are poor and powerless.
I have always believed that we should all have a good understanding of 'opinion-management'; that its various devices and mechanisms should be taught in schools. Not so that we all become spin-doctors – but rather, so ubiquitous and powerful is the day-to-day impact upon us of hundreds of attempts to manage our opinions – that we should all learn to recognise such manipulations, and develop what I might term our capacity for 'intellectual self-defence'.
And one of those key methods of defending yourself from being manipulated into believing nonsense, is a requirement to see the facts.
Facts – as opposed to mere assertions; evidence – as opposed to claims.
As Chomsky has said, when it comes to trying to gain an accurate understanding of an issue, there is no substitute for facts.
But – of course – there are different facts – of different relevance. And there are different interpretations that can be made of such facts.
So, to be sure, the bald facts alone won't always lead us to enlightenment.
But – such facts as are available, are most certainly a very good place to start.
And, in respect of trying to make sense of the Jersey Child Abuse Disaster – and, in particular, the controversy of the last 16 months – we do, actually, have a tremendous quantity of facts – of evidential items – at our disposal.
A consideration of those facts, I would suggest, helps us to form a reasonable opinion as to which side in the Jersey child abuse controversy is more likely to be right; more likely to have an intellectually sustainable position.
Whilst this does risk over-simplifying the argument, there are two broad views of the question of concealed child abuse in Jersey.
The first, in which I would place myself, includes people like the survivors, whistle-blowers, straight cops, competent journalists, Graham Power, many families, Lenny Harper and various campaigners and members of the public around the world.
This first group could be categorised as broadly having the view that Jersey's various public authorities have systemically failed, over a period of decades, to properly protect children from abuse; that therefore such abuse has gone on largely unchecked and unpunished; that the abuses committed have caused awful suffering and have been immensely destructive to the lives of the survivors; that it is possible there might have even been child deaths; that certain highly-placed individuals in Jersey, including current and former senior public employees, ether committed abuse or knew of abuse but concealed it; and that such is the gravity of the many decades of systemic failure to protect children, the Jersey establishment has a vested interest in concealing the full truth, and that even today, the island's public authorities have attempted to disguise the facts by sabotaging the investigation.
The second group includes such people as Jersey's Crown Officers, its judiciary, the establishment politicians, the Chief Minister, Home Affairs Minister and the rest of the cabinet, most of the very senior level of Jersey's civil servants, all Jersey's news editors and most of the island's journalist.
This second group might be described as being broadly of the view that, OK, there were some examples of child abuse, but only a few – absolutely nothing like the quantity suggested; that child abuse happens in all societies, and that Jersey has been no different; that, over the decades, the island's authorities have performed no worse than similar authorities in the UK in dealing with these issues; that a lot of the survivors who came forward were just exaggerating or making it up; that even the possibility of unexplained child deaths has been evidentially virtually eliminated; that it is not true that over the decades and up to the present day, senior civil servants have abused children or concealed the abuse of children; that there was no need for the bad publicity; that the police investigation was not politically suppressed; that Graham Power's suspension was justified; and that Jersey does have effective and functioning checks and balances.
Let us describe those two camps as 'Group 1' and 'Group 2'.
Imagine – you're an objective, impartial person – who wants to try and form a reasonably robust and intellectually-sound opinion – as to which of those two groups is more likely to be broadly correct in their view.
Of course, any fact-based opinion has to be revisable – because it wouldn't be intellectually cogent to remain wedded to a particular opinion, if new evidence emerged that weakened the opinion one had previously held.
So – none of us are yet in a position to come to a rock-solidly evidenced, definitive, final opinion on the controversy – because events are yet to run their full course.
And I can assure readers there is more yet to emerge.
But we can form an 'interim' opinion; one based upon the evidence – the facts – so far available to us at this stage.
So we consider the contrasting positions of Group 1 and of Group 2 – and we ask ourselves – which of those two opinions is supported by the most actual evidence; the most facts?
To-date – which side in the dispute is most strongly supported by evidence presently in the public domain?
It is Group 1.
And not only is it Group 1 – by some marginal weighing of considerations.
It is Group 1 by a crushing, overwhelming advantage of published, hard, documented evidence.
Indeed, when considering the "success" the Jersey oligarchy Group 2 has had in manipulating – or 'managing' - the opinions of many people in Jersey, we see demonstrated all over again – the immense importance of facts – if you wish to avoid being conned.
Look back over the last 16 months, and consider the relentless barrage of propaganda from the Jersey oligarchy – the sheer, relentless saturation coverage based upon nothing more than un-evidenced assertions and repeated claims that Group 1 "has-no-evidence".
During that time – what "evidence" has Group 2 actually adduced?
A totally un-evidenced claim – a mere assertion – that a supposed "interim report" by the Metropolitan Police, received in November 2008, justified the unprecedented political condemnation of, and sabotaging of, the abuse investigation – and the supposed "emergency" suspension of a decorated Chief Constable, Graham Power QPM.
Amazing – when one thinks about it – that all the propaganda of the Jersey oligarchy and their media – propaganda to be seen in JEP editorial comments, BBC Jersey bias, and absurdly slanted reports by CTV – is based – when you get down to it – on nothing more than that supposed Metropolitan Police report – and the second-hand claims made for it by David Warcup, Mick Gradwell, Frank Walker, Andrew Lewis, Ian Le Marquand and Terry Le Sueur.
But, worse; we now know that the alleged report of the Metropolitan Police – if any document worthy of description as a 'report' existed at that time in November 2008 – has long-since been disowned by the Metropolitan Police.
So even that one single nebulous item of alleged "evidence" - has been disowned by those who produced it.
Group 2 simply has no published evidence – at all – to substantiate any of its claims.
But what, then, of Group 1?
Group 1 is broadly of the view that child abuse has occurred in Jersey over a period of decades; that what distinguishes Jersey from elsewhere is that there has been a persistent and consistent Culture of Concealment on the part of all of Jersey's authorities, who have colluded in various cover-ups; that people guilty of abuse and the unlawful concealment of abuse have been repeatedly protected from prosecution; that many of them occupied or continue to occupy high public sector posts; that this is evidenced in the clear failure of any of the normal checks and balances of societies to stop, expose and punish such conduct; and that the Jersey establishment has conspired to unlawfully sabotage the investigation and prevent the truth emerging.
Today sees the publication of yet more evidence that supports the view of Group 1.
Two further documents – to add to the significant number already published.
Below, you can read the second report of the Association of Chief Police Officers.
And – on the Voice for Children site – you can read the second of the suspension review meeting transcripts, in which the Home Affairs Minister, Ian Le Marquand, was "reviewing" the unlawful suspension of Chief Constable Graham Power QPM.
And what of the other published, hard evidence that supports the view of Group 1?
I'm conscious of the fact that this is a long blog posting, so I won't list every single item; instead I list here some of the key documents that are published – and which – tragically in so many ways – prove the accuracy of the fact-based opinion of Group 1:
The Sharp report.
The e-mail of Anton Cornelissen.
The Dylan Southern Report.
The so-called "Grand-Prix" policy of unlawful solitary confinement against children.
The employment tribunal testimony of Simon Bellwood.
The legal opinion of Chris Callander of the Howard League, one of Britain's leading child protection lawyers.
The report of the Howard League for Penal Reform.
Graham Power's July 2007 file-note.
Graham Power's e-mail reply to me of the 21st November, 2007.
Bill Ogley's lying file-note to Simon Crowcroft.
The Council of Minister's minutes of 26th July 2007.
Lenny Harper's affidavit.
Lenny Harper's guest posting on this blog.
Graham Power's affidavit.
The evidence obtained by Graham Power from the electronic data, which shows the letters written to inform him of his "emergency" suspension had, in fact, been worked on for days prior to the event.
Suspension review transcript 1.
Suspension review Transcript 2.
And – there is yet more evidence to emerge. The case is made. At the present time, the broad, general opinion of Group 1 is based upon at least 19 items of published, key evidence.
That is 19 more than the opinion of Group 2 is based upon.
If you wish to be reasonably confident that your opinion is based upon facts – as opposed to the empty, yet relentless propaganda of the Jersey oligarchy – until and unless Group 2 begin to 'produce the goods' - to 'put up or shut up' – it is the opinion of Group 1 you must side with.
Before turning to the latest item of evidence – the second ACPO report published below – a few observations.
I'm not superstitious – but I can't resist pointing out that – by serendipity – this happens to be the 13th Letter from Exile – and it is published on the 13th – and that amongst the many disasters for the Jersey oligarchy evidenced in this ACPO report – is Recommendation 13 and associated finding – which provides yet more compelling evidence that the Chief Constable, Graham Power QPM was carrying out his duties absolutely correctly:
"Recommendation 13: That the Chief Officer maintains a safety zone between the investigation and any demands of politicians.
The Chief of Police has maintained a role in updating Jersey’s politicians and wider community. An article interviewing him in The Jersey Post regarding his Annual Report of 2007 also included aspects of Operation Rectangle. It is understood that he has received a statement including allegations of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and other offences. He will seek independent legal advice regarding these allegations."
Incidentally, the point concerning the complaints of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice is made again at paragraph 20:
"20: The team are aware that a Member of Parliament in Jersey has made a statement alleging conspiracies, destruction of evidence and perverting the course of justice. This has been discussed with the Chief of Police in Jersey and he is to obtain legal advice regarding the allegations and will ensure that any investigation is undertaken by a different SIO than the SIO for Operation Rectangle."
Those formal criminal complaints of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and other offences, were made by me. I gave many lengthy and detailed statements to police officers; statements that were carefully written and formally signed and filed.
Under the leadership of Graham Power, the investigation was being handled entirely properly.
What a contrast with David Warcup. I long since gave up asking – but Warcup repeatedly refused to even tell me what has become of those complaints.
The crimes complained of, have been buried – like so many other crimes in Jersey.
As the evidence shows.
Report of the Association of Chief Police Officers, prepared for the States of Jersey Police in respect of the Historical Child Abuse Investigation.
Operation Rectangle: Haut de la Garenne, Jersey – Historical Child Abuse Investigation and possible homicide case.
Andy Baker (SOCA), Anne Harrison and John Mooney (NPIA).
1. Between the 29th February and 2nd March 2008, representatives from the Association of Chief Police Officers Homicide Working Group visited Jersey to review and advise the historical child abuse investigation and possible homicide case at Haut de la Garenne children’s home in the island. The team were appointed by Jon Stoddart, Chief Constable Durham Constabulary and Chair of the ACPO HWG. The team worked to terms of reference signed by Graham Power. Chief Officer States of Jersey Police and Andy Baker on behalf of the ACPO HWG.
2. The Senior Investigating Officer for Operation Rectangle is Deputy Chief Officer Lenny Harper. A strategic report based on the team’s findings was presented to The States of Jersey Police on the 4th March 2008; the report included 27 recommendations.
3. Mentoring – since the original visit, Andy Baker has continued to mentor Lenny Harper, Anne Harrison has continued to mentor Detective Inspector Keith Bray and John Mooney has continued to mentor Detective Sergeant Dave Hill.
4. On 7th March 2008, at the request of the Chief Minister, Frank Walker, Andy Baker and Anne Harrison visited the island and met with Mr. Walker, Wendy Kinnard (the Home Affairs Minister), Andrew Lewis (deputy to Ms Kinnard) and Bill Ogley (Chief Executive Officer in the States of Jersey). The two briefed the group and candidly answered questions they raised. A written record of the meeting is available.
5. On the 13th March 2008, Andy Baker and John Mooney visited the island. They observed the Independent Advisory Group’s first meeting, visited the Major Incident Room to assess progress therein and discussed the Investigations with a number of the team.
6. It was agreed that the team return to Jersey to monitor the 27 recommendations, to maintain the role of mentors and to identify any further work. This follow up visit took place between the 25th and 27th March 2008.
7. The recommendations from the initial visit have been acted upon, some within a very short period following delivery of the initial report. The States of Jersey Police are to be commended for their positive reception of the report and for their extremely prompt response in implementing the recommendations.
8. Action taken with the timeframes on recommendations from the initial visit.
Recommendation 1: That an agenda is prepared for this (and other meetings) and a minute taker of records the salient points and any decisions.
From the 4th March 2008, Vickie Ellis has been appointed minute taker and every meeting has an agenda and a record is maintained. Copies of the minutes are not yet retained on the Holmes account. This should be addressed and the deputy SIO has been reminded of this requirement.
Recommendation 2: That the deputy SIO (Detective Inspector Keith Bray) provides an update of any points of interest that includes – the MIR, the Outside Enquiry Team, Analysis and Intelligence Cell. In key areas, consideration should be given to inviting colleagues responsible for these areas of the investigation.
DI Bray attends the management meetings and provides a current situation report. This is also provided to both the outside enquiry team and the MIR; a copy of all reports are held on Holmes as “other documents”.
Recommendation 3: That the SIO considers a mechanical process for sifting debris.
On the 4th March 2008, a mechanical sifter was borrowed from the Counter Terrorist Command at New Scotland Yard. It was in place on the 5th March in one of the sifting areas at Haut de la Garenne. The team saw this being used and it has speeded up the process.
Recommendation 4: That the three exhibit sites be detailed in the policy book. That the Crime Scene Manager provides a statement that details the exhibits and could include a time line, e.g. “these are the exhibits recovered at the Haut de la Garenne care home between the 1st January 2008 and the 1st March 2008. The examination of the scene has not been completed and further exhibits will be correctly recorded and submitted at appropriate periods.”
The SIO officer has entered a policy decision on the 13th March. The exhibits at Haut de la Garenne are retained at a secure area and the Scene Manger retains an exhibit book and log. She will provide a full statement giving account of control and movement. The Exhibits Officer retains control of all other exhibits and retains a record of movement on Holmes. The documents and files in “the cage” are exhibited in batches. When specific papers are removed, they are sub-exhibited as required with a full record on Holmes.
Recommendation 5: That the SIO review this position and seeks advice from his trained Family Liaison Co-ordinator and, through Detective Sergeant Teresa Russell NPIA, seeks advice from Detective Constable Duncan McGarry (NPIA).
On the 20th March Duncan McGarry visited the MIR. He was apprised of the FLO policy from DS Dave Hill (the Office Manager). He gave advice on an FLO strategy, best practice and exit policy for victims.
Recommendation 7: The SIO should consider whether all residents will be reviewed (or not)?
On the 18th March, the SIO recorded the policy that not all victims will be interviewed as a matter of course. They will only be interviewed if they come forward and are victims or witnesses of material evidence.
Recommendation 8: The SIO should consider a policy for dealing with such victims and record it as a matter of policy.
Recommendation 9: The SIO should discuss Wateridge with the Prosecuting authority.
On the 15 March the SIO met with the Force legal advisor, Lawrence O’Donnell. They discussed Wateridge. He is to be re-interviewed week commencing the 24th March regarding other allegations and offences. All parties are content with this way forward.
Recommendation 10: The SIO must detail any arrest strategies in the Policy Files.
On 19th March, the SIO detailed his arrest strategy in his policy/decision log.
Recommendation 11: The SIO should ascertain from the proper authorities, and recover, any records or files of people who worked at the home (following advice from the data protection officer).
The head of Social Services, Tony Le Seuer, provides full access to any files required. The enquiry team has immediate access to the files and can remove any on receipt. This process is intelligence led; in that, as the intelligence cell identifies a former worker of interest a call is made and the files searched for and recovered against receipt.
Recommendation 12: The SIO must set strategies for contingencies of victims and suspects harming themselves and the likelihood of suspects fleeing to other countries.
All victims and suspects are risk assessed by the officer who has the action to deal with the individual. On 25th March, the deputy SIO has provided Special Branch with details of all suspects for tracking of movement if they attempt to leave Jersey.
Recommendation 13: That the Chief Officer maintains a safety zone between the investigation and any demands of politicians.
The Chief of Police has maintained a role in updating Jersey’s politicians and wider community. An article interviewing him in The Jersey Post regarding his Annual Report of 2007 also included aspects of Operation Rectangle. It is understood that he has received a statement including allegations of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and other offences. He will seek independent legal advice regarding these allegations.
Recommendation 14: That the key members of Investigation team consider the offer of specific mentors from his team.
This is on-going and the key members of the enquiry have welcomed and taken the opportunity to seek advice from their respective mentors.
Recommendations 15: That the SIO, deputy SIO and Office Manager have clear demarcation of their roles and adhere to them.
As of the 10th March, when PNICC provided additional resources on mutual aid, the three key members of the enquiry work to their specific roles detailed within MIRSAP.
Recommendation 16: That the Chief Officer considers appointing someone temporarily undertake the duties of deputy chief officer.
On 10th March, Sean Du Val was appointed temporary Deputy Chief Officer. He undertakes all the functions within that rank leaving the SIO to concentrate on Operation Rectangle.
Recommendation 17: That the Chief Officer and SIO consider a Community Impact Assessment and convene an Independent Advisory Group. The IAG should not include former residents at this home, could include advisors from NSPCC or Community groups. The IAG could advise on the CIA.
On 19th March, a Community Impact Assessment was completed. The first meeting of the Independent Advisory Group was held on the 13th March 2008.
Recommendation 18: The media officers should put together an internal media process and ensure it is kept current.
On 7th March, an internal document was drawn up and made available to all staff.
Recommendation 19: That other accommodation is found for the enquiry team and that the MIR is extended to the current room used by the enquiry team. This may allow the Document Reader / OM / Deputy SIO to use the current MIR for work that requires a quieter environment. States of Jersey Police recognised this from the upsurge in calls over recent days and are in the process of addressing this matter.
On 10th March, the MIR took over the two rooms of the MIR and the outside enquiry team moved into separate accommodation on the second floor of police headquarters. In three or four week’s time a new MIR will be made available in Broadcasting House – a nearby police rented building.
Recommendation 20: That the call centre phones are located elsewhere and have a “relevant” number of dedicated call-takers with appropriate skills. This call centre can be staffed during office hours and have a suitable answering message for other times. This will fluctuate depending on the media coverage etc, but best practice is to enhance numbers initially as it’s then easier to stand people down. This call centre should include child abuse trained officers.
On 17th March, a dedicated Call-Centre with two staff, one a member of the enquiry team and the other a member of the NSPCC was located in the enquiry team’s office.
Recommendation 21: Through Mutual Aid a dedicated experienced Receiver and a dedicated experienced Action Manager are found for the MIR. (These roles may, at some time in the future, be able to be combined when the incident volumes settle down). Additional typing staff should also be identified and posted to the MIR.
From 10th March, a Receiver, Action Manager, two Readers and additional typists were dedicated to the MIR.
Recommendation 22: The Deputy SIO should review the Actions queues on behalf of the SIO to focus the MIR to the relevant lines of enquiry. The Deputy SIO should undertake this review with a dedicated Action Manager over the course of a day or two, this would allow the number to be dramatically reduced to relevant Actions with the remainder being put to “For Referral” or “referred”. It should be noted that they would still be searchable in those queues should they become relevant as the enquiry continues. This would assist to “clear the ground” from under their feet to allow a clearer focus on what Actions are relevant.
The Deputy SIO and Office Manager now have a regular QA system in place (see recommendation 42)
Recommendation 23: That there should be assurance that all of the good work being done for the enquiry at the various locations and countries is captured via relevant documentation associated to the incident Actions. For example the work by the search dog; the work by the Archaeological digs etc. One option may be to feed synopses of work being done by experts into the MIR via the coordinating SOCO which should be controlled via Actions. Such documents could be “living documents” on a daily basis to be typed up. This would form a good source of intelligence / update information for the SIO rather than having to rely on minutiae detail from each and every area.
This is now in place and the SIO is updated at management meetings regarding this action.
It is suggested that an SIO (Andy Tattersall GMP) with previous experience of such abuse cases together with a Disclosure expert (Ian Lloyd or Graham Marshall, West Midlands Police) are invited through Teresa Russell to apprise and advise the best way to do this that will comply with Disclosure advice, best practice and regulations.
On 17th March Andy Tattersall visited the enquiry and met with key members of the team.
Recommendation 24: That all policy files are recorded on the Holmes account.
The policy files were already on the Holmes and are available for the team to see.
Recommendation 25: The SIO should consider this issue in any risk assessment conducted on the victims as well as the suspects.
See recommendation 12 above.
Recommendation 26: Consideration should be give to investing in both a full HOLMES system for States of Jersey Police and the requisite training for staff.
A report has been submitted to the Home Affairs Minister.
Recommendation 27: That the States of Jersey Police consider all the recommendations and take appropriate action. It is suggested that this team returns to Jersey in four weeks time to revisit any recommendations, the enquiry and make further recommendations as appropriate.
This recommendation is complete.
9. Advice from Andy Tattersall – The review suggested that an SIO, experienced in a similar type of enquiry, should visit the investigation team, see how matters are being progressed and make suggestions as to how to manage the next phases of the investigation – that if there is no evidence of homicide it will then be a complex historical child abuse investigation against a number of individuals. The team acknowledges that the SIO has already prioritised the intended arrests; the team feels, however, that a structured and transparent approach will allow the Holmes account to be amended to meet the needs of the investigation and assist in the presentation of prosecution files.
10. Andy Tattersall presented a scoring matrix to prioritise and manage multiple charges against individuals at separate trials. The team have considered his comments and amended his suggestions to address the specific requirements of Operation Rectangle. This proposal allows the SIO to prioritise and manage his strategy for arrests and prosecutions. We base this on a scale of one to ten (with the higher figure being of higher value) and in four categories, being: suspect; victim(s); offence(s); and other considerations. Any category hitting a 30 – 40 figure will be the highest priority, a 20 – 30 figure the next and so on through 10 – 20 and 1 – 10. The SIO must be allowed flexibility as there may be a high number for offender yet a low number in the other categories and the risk may be too great to allow the suspect, for example, to be allowed to continue to work with children. The matrix therefore is a foundation for risk management of defendants once charged and victims / witnesses once they make their statement.
11. For suspect – working with children and access to children = 10 points; likely to escape or evade prosecution = 8 points; their status, at the time of the offence or subsequently, in the community = 6 points; their previous criminality = 4 points; and their age, health and circumstances = 2 points.
12. For victim(s) – that their account has corroboration = 10; credibility of their allegation(s) = 8; directly came to police = 6 points; third party involvement adds weight to their account, e.g. have reported what happened to a third party = 4 points; and have sought long term assistance = 2 points. There are obviously some negative aspects for victims, viz: - inconsistencies in accounts have been abused and become abusers themselves and speaking to the media (for money or otherwise).
13. For offence(s) – serious sexual assault = 10 points; serious assault (GBH) or evidence of regular abuse or systematic abuse or emotional abuse = 8 points; indecent assault = 6 points; assault occasioning ABH = 4 points; and minor assault = 2 points. Evidence of torture must be considered as an equivalent of (at least) 8 points.
14. For other considerations – legal advice to charge = 10 points; corroboration of the allegation = 8 points; independent evidence of grooming = 6 points; two or more victims making allegations against a specific suspect; and third party or media reporting that the offence took place = 2 points.
Recommendation 28: That the SIO considers a scoring matrix to manage and prioritise the arrests of any suspects.
15. As suggested by Andy Tattersall the team agrees that the SIO considers appointing a lead officer to manage each suspect, maintaining an investigation log to report progress. However, everything undertaken in this way must be recorded on Holmes for the SIO to direct and co-ordinate the strategy and way forward.
16. Andy Tattersall also recommended that the Holmes Account be sub divided to manage the prosecution against a number of defendants. See below at recommendation 39 below.
Recommendation 29: That the SIO considers appointing lead officers for each suspect and they maintain a structured investigative log for each of their designated suspects.
17. Advice from Duncan McGarry – Detective Constable Duncan McGarry, the NPIA national family liaison advisor has visited the enquiry team. He feels that the current practice of the first contact officer fulfilling the family liaison role is unsustainable in the long term. He gives reasons that a turn-over of staff (particularly from the UK) will not maintain the same liaison officer throughout the enquiry. Whilst FLOs move on and a handover does take place in many enquiries, it is more than likely that the current FLO strategy in Operation Rectangle would mean this occurring on a much more regular basis.
18. Additionally, in the absence of a coherent family liaison strategy, there is significant potential for inconsistent practice from victim to victim.
Recommendation 30: That Detective Inspector Alan Williamson or other trained Family Liaison Co-ordinator, creates and implements a family liaison strategy in accordance with the advice from DC McGarry
19. The team has asked the SIO to define the parameters of the investigation. He has confirmed that it includes: the homicide investigation at Haut de la Garenne; the historical child abuse allegations at Haut de la Garenne; a confidential allegation in respect of a high profile member of the community; any suspect who worked at Haut de la Garenne who then went on to work in child care and allegations relate to that subsequent role; any victim at Haut de la Garenne who was relocated into alternative child care and further abused; and any offence that occurred with a connection to Haut de la Garenne, e.g. day trip boat rides. It does not include any allegations of cover up, conspiracy to pervert the course of justice by a public official or any other unrelated homicide or allegation of child abuse.
20. The team are aware that a Member of Parliament in Jersey has made a statement alleging conspiracies, destruction of evidence and perverting the course of justice. This has been discussed with the Chief of Police in Jersey and he is to obtain legal advice regarding the allegations and will ensure that any investigation is undertaken by a different SIO than the SIO for Operation Rectangle.
21. The homicide investigation – the piece of skull has yet to be carbon dated by LGC or their sub-contractors. It is understood that the delay has been caused by faulty machinery. A breakdown in communication obviously occurred as the SIO was unaware of this issue. LGC should be asked to note this comment and ensure that any delays in their work are brought to the attention of the SIO.
Recommendation 31: That the Crime Scene Manager and SOCO ensures that this issue has been brought to the attention of LGS management.
22. As soon as the piece of skull has been dated and forensically examined and, subject to any other intelligence that a homicide has occurred at the home, the SIO must decision log the continuance of a homicide investigation as part of Operation Rectangle or not.
Recommendation 32: That once the provenance of the piece of skull is known, the SIO decides and decision logs the continuance or not of the homicide investigation.
23. If Operation Rectangle ceases to be a homicide, the SIO should take advice to treat the piece of skull with the dignity of a religious ceremony or not. The IAG could assist him on this aspect.
Recommendation 33: If not a homicide, the SIO seeks advice from the Deputy Viscount’s office how to deal with the piece of bone.
24. The whole incident was originally declared a critical incident on the 9th December 2007. If however there is no homicide, the matter reverts to a complex historical child abuse investigation. The SIO must then reconsider declaring it a critical incident again – with IAG support, family liaison strategies and other strategies to meet that need.
Recommendation 34: If there is no homicide at Haut de la Garenne the case remains a complex historical child abuse investigation, the SIO should then reconsider declaring it a critical incident and instigate police supporting that decision.
25. Scene Management – the search has identified two further basement or cellar rooms at the home. The SIO and Crime Scene Manager are devising their strategy to search these two rooms and the courtyard. The two rooms will be dealt with in a similar fashion as the first two rooms. That is the correct course of action as this is based on victims’ allegations of abuse within the confines of those rooms. The courtyard will be searched based on indications from the blood dogs used on the site. Again, this is the correct course of action as there is no other intelligence or evidence indicating that offences were committed in these areas.
26. Forensic strategy – comment has already been made regarding the piece of skull. The search of the scene is yielding a number of exhibits – hair, blood, condom wrapper and a used condom. A forensic strategy needs to be devised to, not only examine these exhibits but to compare any DNA from victims at the home and the UK National DNA database against them. This should also include victims’ DNA comparison against the blood recovered from the scene.
Recommendation 35: A forensic strategy must be drawn up to cover all exhibits that have been recovered for comparison against victims and the UK database.
27. Bones including some scorched ones have been recovered from the home. The team should seek expert advice on how best to examine the bones and what forensic opportunities may exist, including dating when they were burnt.
Recommendation 36: The SIO must obtain expert forensic advice regarding the recovered bones from the scene.
28. Victims – There are 150 victims that have come forward and made allegations of abuse at the home. Some have expressed their confidence in the investigation; they base this on what they have seen on TV and in newspapers. However, the team fear that victims of extreme physical or sexual abuse, who may still be severely traumatised by their experience, will be reluctant to step forward. Specialist advice from a clinical psychologist with regard to construction of a sensitive media appeal may aid them in making a decision.
Recommendation 37: Through Theresa Russell, NPIA, the SIO seeks the advice of Adrian West with regard to a sensitive media appeal for reluctant victims to come forward and report crimes.
29. If severely traumatised victims do come forward, additional specialist resources may be required to receive them and arrange for their long term care.
30. The Prosecution authorities in Jersey have appointed two advocates to advise on legal issues of the investigation. The SIO is to meet with them on the 28th March 2008. This will include aspects on Wateridge and other suspects.
31. Witnesses – There may well be a number of adults who worked at the home who are not suspected of any criminal offence. These can be identified through records. The SIO should consider a strategy to encourage such potential witnesses to come forward.
Recommendation 38: That the SIO considers a strategy to encourage workers at the home to provide evidence.
32. Risk Assessments – The update of recommendation 12 was that the staff are risk assessing the victims and suspects. These must quality assured and supervised.
Recommendation 39: All risk assessments must be quality assured and supervised by the deputy SIO.
33. The Major incident Room – The receiver has returned to his home force. This creates a break in the experienced continuity within the MIR for a vital role. The Office Manager is currently undertaking this work; this is not sustainable for any prolonged period.
Recommendation 40: The SIO seeks an experienced Receiver – ideally be Monday 31st march 2008.
34. There are many ways in dividing the data held on a Holmes account to make it retrievable for specific incidents and against a number of defendants. Tags or User defined Fields (UDFs) can be used. There are no hard and fast ways of doing this but Detective Sergeant Kevin Denley, (Devon & Cornwall Office Manager in the MIR) is confident that he can arrange for the account to be structured to meet these requirements. If any further expert advice is required on this a disclosure expert such as Ian Lloyd or Graham Marshall from West Midlands police should be consulted.
Recommendation 41: In conjunction with the advice from Andy Tattersall, if the enquiry is a complex historical child abuse investigation, the SIO considers how best to sub-divide the Holmes account to address individual suspects.
35. The Holmes Account – Actions: an additional 367 actions have been raised since 13th March 2008 giving an overall total of Actions of 1389. A large number of the overall actions (389) are still shown as allocated with only 8 “for referral” and 18 “referred”.
Recommendation 42: Within seven days, a full review of the incident actions is made to assess and prioritise the work of the enquiry team. This will identify areas of priority to provide the SIO THE BEST EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AGAINST SUSPECTS. This should be completed by Keith Bray and Dave Hill.
36. Other documentation – the queues for the other documentation, in particular the ODs and messages in the “Reading” queue appear to be very large (456 Messages and 526 ODs). The MIR staff are confident these have been initially “read” by the receiver for any priority Actions which are then being raised. Therefore nothing significant is being missed.
37. Dave Hill (the Action Manager) is currently quality assuring the actions returned by the enquiry team. This should cease and the quality assurance on the returned actions should be undertaken by the receiver. This will allow Dave Hill to concentrate on his role as per recommendation 42.
Recommendation 43: That the receiver receives and quality assures the returning actions from the Enquiry team.
38. Intelligence / Analysis – There are 51 suspects on the Holmes account, this includes up to 12 suspects from the Sea Cadets aspect of the early investigation, Recommendations have already been made to prioritise these suspects, risk assess them and manage the evidence for individual trials against them through the Holmes account.
39. Resources – The enquiry has now received staff from the mutual aid programme through PNICC. However, with the return of the receiver to his Force the MIR is light of a key role.
40. Once the Actions have been reviewed the SIO should reconsider is further staff is required for both the MIR and the enquiry team.
Recommendation 44: Following the review of Actions (see recommendation 41 above) the SIO reconsiders the staff requirements.
41. PNICC are currently considering the mutual aid requirements from the medium to long term. This should be in conjunction with the SIO.
Recommendation 45: The SIO should discuss medium to long term requirements with PNICC.
42. It is understood that the States of Jersey Finance department has a separate cost code for Operation Rectangle. The Chief Minister has publicly stated that the money will be made available for the investigation to be undertaken. This is separate to the annual police budget.
43. The Independent Advisory Group – the IAG consists of five members from the community. They have held two meetings to date and minutes are retained. The team sat in on the first two meetings and assisted with the advisory group role and process.
44. Governance – the Chief Officer retains the independent position to advise the politicians and wider community. This not only protects the enquiry from political interference but allows the SIO and team to focus on the enquiry.
45. Mentoring – the team will continue to advise and mentor the key players of the enquiry and intend to return in May once the handover of deputy SIO from Keith Bray to Allison Fossey takes place.
46. Other considerations – Jersey may wish to consider maintaining its own violent and sex offender register or alternatively linking in with the existing UK system and also checking the criminal records of subjects wishing to take up paid or voluntary employment with children through the UK Criminal Records Bureau.