LETTER FROM EXILE: # 22

LOOKING INTO THE MICROCOSM
FROM REALITY.

Blanche Pierre –

The Anatomy of an On-going Atrocity.

Part 8.

Blanche Pierre – Haut de la Garenne:

A Continuum of Crime.

A.C.P.O 3/4:

Yet More Evidence that HDLG

Investigation was Good.

Therefore Suspension of Police Chief

Was Unlawful.

"Recommendation 13: That the Chief Officer maintains a safety zone between the investigation and any demands of politicians.

The Chief of Police has maintained a role in updating Jersey’s politicians and wider community. An article interviewing him in The Jersey Evening Post regarding his Annual Report of 2007 has also included aspects of Operation Rectangle. It is understood that he has received a statement including allegations of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and other offences. He will seek independent legal advice regarding these allegations."

ACPO3/4.

"5 Intelligence/Analysis

5.1 It is known that some victims were abused by more than one person and that a number of the abusers assaulted numerous victims. The analyst should interrogate all the evidence and provide charting of the abusers and abused children, together with time lines. This will assist interviews, prosecutors and presentation at court.

Recommendation 50: That the analyst prepares charts of abusers and abused children, together with timelines."

ACPO 3/4.

"8 Victims of child abuse and witnesses management

8.1 The deputy SIO has overseen a review of all the victims, identifying those that had been abused within the offence parameters set by the SIO. There are now 116 victims of child abuse that meet the criteria, whom have come forward to report crimes committed against them at the Home."

ACPO 3/4

"6 The homicide Investigation

6.1 Since the last visit, the sifting at the scene has unearthed some 30 fragments of bone and seven teeth. A definitive forensic analysis of all the samples is incomplete. It appears however, that one bone is a piece of a female child’s tibia. Additionally, some of the bones have been cut and some of the milk teeth have long roots, suggesting that they did not naturally fall out. The initial views from expert examinations are that these bones and teeth originate from two children. These facts indicate an unexplained death or deaths and it is appropriate that the investigation continues to pursue what happened to the children."

ACPO 3/4.

"10 Forensic Strategy

10.1 Articles in the Mail on Sunday (18.5.08) and the Daily Mail (19.5.08) criticised the SIO and the investigation, focusing on the forensic processing. This specifically relates to the first piece of ‘skull’ found at the Home. The articles were followed by some criticism in political circles. The Review team immediately saw the damage this has caused to some of the investigation team and sapped their morale. The political criticism is extremely unhelpful and, if leaked will fuel the media comments and will divert the investigation, Of course, political players have every right in the public’s interest to question efficiency and effectiveness of the investigation but this does not include ridiculing members of the team.

Recommendation 54: That the Chief Officer of States of Jersey Police considers raising what the politician has done with the appropriate authorities."

ACPO 3/4.

This posting will conclude - for the time being - our examination of the Blanch Pierre child abuse atrocity. A crime that I very deliberately describe as 'on-going'; as persisting over the years and decades.

I do so because not only is the suffering - and the denial of justice - a continuous presence in the lives of the survivors - I do so because the broad, criminal enterprise - of facilitating and concealing the child abuse that occurred - continues to the present day.

And the evidence for that guilty conduct by the States of Jersey is there - to be seen - not only in that one crime - but also in respect of the concealment of child abuse in general.

For example - the criminal concealment of the true extent of the crimes that occurred at Haut de le Garenne - and the on-going unlawful suspension of the Chief Constable of the Jersey Police Force, Graham Power.

An unlawful suspension, facilitated by the acting police chief - David Warcup.

A fact rendered all the more staggering - given that parts of the ACPO report, which is reproduced below - confirm that the ACPO team met with Warcup - he was satisfied with their findings - and wanted them to continue to be involved.

This being the very same ACPO team who endorsed the investigation - and, specifically, the role plaid by the Chief Constable, Graham Power.

Yet - a few months later - Warcup was ignoring all of the ACPO reports - and, instead, embarked upon the unlawful usurping of Mr. Power - on the basis of nothing more than a now-discredited memo - written by a personal friend of Warcup's from the Metropolitan police.

No matter which aspect of the child protection disasters we look at in Jersey - failure and wilful malfeasance are the dominant features of what is - clearly - a systemic entity.

In Part 1 of this series of postings, I explored just how it is that bad and evil things can happen – almost, not quite, but almost – by accident. How people, in failing to be aware of factors such as the Diffusion of Responsibility, of Moral Disengagement and of Groupthink – and of personal distance from the actual, principal, crimes – can end up being components in extensive criminal enterprises.

Not only have such phenomena been very well explored and documented in social psychology, so common-place are they, that several theories of law also address group malfeasances, and the culpability of individuals. Perhaps the most famous expression of the simultaneous nature of collective and of individual responsibility being the rejection of the Nuremburg defence, as used by the Nazis, who sought exculpation from their crimes, by claiming that they were "only obeying orders".

The law, on that occasion, rightly establishing that actual and moral guilt for crimes could not be assigned from those involved in the committing of those offences, merely because a superior had issued the authority.

We are – each of us – responsible for our own actions – no matter how slight – if we are playing a role in a greater crime.

But, just as people often have the most profound difficulty in perceiving their inchoate responsibility for crimes – people equally have a difficulty in even perceiving that the crimes exist and can often be continual in time – on-going – and often of vast and dramatic complexity – spreading out to greater and greater extent in ever-expanding ripples that bring more and more people into the realm of culpability.

And that difficulty of perception, that prevents people from truly seeing and understanding just what it is they are involved in – can often be the very salve – the very tranquilising-agent – which drugs people and equips them to take part in the gravest of crimes, merely because they are distant from the original or immediate offence.

A way to overcome this difficulty in perceiving reality is to step-back – so that you can see the truth – by being able to see the whole picture – not just your own, small, immediate inchoate part in it.

Look at the whole – reality.

And for our purposes - that broad reality is that which has taken place – and is still taking place – in Jersey; it is a single, monstrous, criminal enterprise.

We might call it the "Jersey Child Abuse Disaster".

We might term it the "Culture of Concealment".

We might conclude that whilst there is no current, established over-arching single criminal offence, with which we could conveniently label this enterprise – nevertheless, so obviously wrong is it – and so obviously involving many principal and inchoate criminal acts – that we must see it as a single phenomena.

However we may see it, that process of "naming" the thing – of seeing it as a whole, specific entity – is always crucial to human understanding.

What happened at Auschwitz, or Dachau, or Ravensbruck were not isolated, unconnected acts of mass-murder. They were components in a greater whole. The most disgusting act in human history. And people rightly see that "thing" as the distinct, entire, entity that it was.

We look back upon it; we see it; we know it. We recognise it.

Many Jewish people describe it as the Shoah; more commonly, "it" is known as the Holocaust.

But we have named it – we see it – for the specific episode in history that it was.

That is not, of course, to compare the persistent hate, contempt, disregard and criminality shown towards vulnerable children for decades in Jersey, with the nature of the Holocaust. But nevertheless, we are confronted with a continuing atrocity, that is a distinct entity, and which is greater than the sum of its parts.

Of course a further distinction can be drawn between the two crimes in that the Nazi leadership specifically and deliberately planned to attempt genocide against the Jewish people. They knew what they were doing – they had the mens rea. By way of contrast there won't – I presume - have been a secret meeting of the leaders of the Jersey oligarchy at which they took a specific decision to knowingly subject the vulnerable children of Jersey to decades of neglect, abuse and torture; to have consciously decided, 'this is what we are going to do, and, moreover, we will also conceal all such crimes'.

So does that absence of a specific 'controlling mind' – with the mens rea for what we now see as the entity that is the Jersey Child Abuse Disaster – mean that those who participate in the atrocity bear no responsibility?

For many good – and obvious – reasons, legal theory does not grant such exculpation to individuals. Not least – because if it did, we would be approaching an acceptance of the Nuremburg 'defence', whereby people could have participated in the most dreadful of crimes – but be able to claim innocence – by asserting, perhaps even accurately, that their role in the crime was so peripheral, they could not perceive that the crime was being committed in the first place – or, even if they had seen the broader enterprise, that they did not know it was a crime.

It is well-known that 'ignorance of the law is no defence', but that is not the only means by which legal theory holds people to responsibility for their own actions.

For example, in civil law, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, or, 'the thing itself speaks', can establish the existence of a broad 'duty of care' – or responsibility – for an act. And even though overall responsibility for the wrong act may lie indistinctly within a group of people, if it is obvious that in that context, that group owed a duty of care, then liability for a wrong suffered by a person, speaks for itself in its obviousness – and need not be directly ascribed to an individual within the group.

And in the realm of criminal law, the existence of inchoate offences has long been established; perhaps the most widely recognised being the offence of conspiracy. An individual may have only played a minor, partial, peripheral role in a conspiracy - but having been so involved, they are guilty of the broader criminal enterprise of the conspiracy.

There can be no doubt that individual employees of the States of Jersey, and the States of Jersey itself, are liable for both civil and criminal wrongs committed against the victims of child abuse. That much is already an unarguable, evidenced fact.

We need only consider the contemporaneous file-note written by Graham Power, the Chief Constable of the States of Jersey Police Force in July 2007 - in which he recorded the criminal conspiracy being engaged in by Bill Ogley, the States of Jersey Chief Executive, and Mike Pollard, the Health & Social Services Chief Executive - to unlawfully engineer my dismissal as Minister, for the purposes of preventing me from exposing child protection failures.

Indeed - the dramatic compounding of that criminal offence is there to be seen in the criminal conduct of William Bailhache who - in his then capacity as Attorney General, refused to prosecute criminals such as Ogley and Pollard.

And that particular example - the criminal conspiracy to pervert the course of justice by seeking to conceal crimes of child abuse - is but one example. The event -the continuum that we can describe as the Jersey Child Abuse Disaster is ladled with similar such examples.

No person vaguely familiar with the facts - for example, the great mass of hard evidence published by this blog - could credibly dispute that all the elements required to establish the existence and the commissioning of various criminal offences are present.

Conspiracies - plots designed to achieve criminal objectives, the mens rea necessary for both primary crimes and for the conspiracy itself, the 'agreement' between a number of people to bring about unlawful outcomes by which people suffer wrongs, the 'general intent', the 'agreement' to act in such ways as to involve the commissioning of a criminal act, the 'facilitation' of such acts - all are evidenced and clear behaviours exhibited by the senior figures in the Jersey oligarchy.

That is why - when I describe the Jersey oligarchy as a 'criminal regime' - I do so quite specifically.

It is a literal fact.

There is no other jurisdiction in the established, democratic world - that would have embraced such overt and comprehensive lawlessness in its conduct.

No matter how one considers the evidence against the Jersey oligarchy, there is no hiding from the fact that the mens rea and the actus reus are clearly present, regardless of whether we consider motivational concurrence or temporal concurrence.

Whether the individuals involved have been the principals or the accessories - the common purpose of breaking the law in known, demonstrable ways - is established - and, so far as I am aware, no mitigation on the grounds of abandonment of the course of criminal conduct could yet be cited by any of the guilty parties.

And in this posting, I publish yet further evidence that shows the criminal conduct of the Jersey oligarchy.

That evidence is the combined third and fourth reports prepared by the Association of Chief Police Officers, who were providing professional oversight of the Jersey historic child abuse investigation. Like the two earlier ACPO reports I have published - it proves that the investigation itself - and, in particular, the overall leadership of the Jersey Police under Graham Power - was of a very high standard.

The offences - the criminal conduct - demonstrated by this evidence - are two-fold.

Not only is it clear from the report that the investigation was justified - both on grounds of many, many cases of child abuse - and the very real discovery of unidentified remains of children - but it also shows the subsequent action of suspending the Chief Constable, Graham Power - to have been without any credible justification, and therefore of itself, another criminal act, designed to sabotage a proper police enquiry.

So how and why - given the overt criminality on display - is the Jersey oligarchy able to get away with such conduct?

Because they are the senior civil service - they are the prosecution system - they are the executive - they are the legislature - they are the judiciary - they are the fourth estate.

Unless we win - by eventually forcing external intervention - there is not the remotest prospect of such comprehensively corrupted power in Jersey - ever holding itself to account.

Even the recently appointed Attorney General, who had an opportunity to, effectively, turn the Jersey oligarchy away from lawlessness and corruption has, instead, foolishly chosen to continue the criminal enterprises engaged in by his predecessors.

So it is going to be a long time before we can rely upon the proper protections of the law in Jersey.

In the mean time - we just have to hope that some of these oligarchs might begin to develop some ethics - or even a little common sense.

And perhaps attempting to stand back from what they have become involved in - and seeing it for the extensive amalgam of criminal offences that it is - perceiving it as a continuum of child abuse and the criminal concealment of such abuse - might assist them in coming to such recognition.

So in an effort to assist those 'players' in the Jersey oligarchy who have become active participants in the atrocity - I will draw the linkages between their actions - and the consequences of their actions - to show that, just as the bureaucrats and facilitators of the Holocaust may as well have been beating people into the gas chambers - Jersey oligarchs are helping today's paedophiles to rape children and for such crimes to be concealed.

Let us say that you are a senior police officer - who has helped the oligarchy bury the child abuse investigation - by mounting the unlawful coup against the Chief Constable.

Imagine your actions as being akin to pimping young boys from Haute de la Garenne to be sodomised by old men.

Or - facilitating enforced abortions on a teenage girls who have been made pregnant through rape at HDLG - and then disposing of the foetus in the old furnace.

If you have helped the Jersey establishment bury the abuse investigation - those are the crimes you are associated with.

Let us imagine - that you are a senior civil servant - and you are aware of gross and systemic cases of child abuse - but you do not inform the police - and nor do you even alert your politicians to the generality of such a breakdown in social services.

Imagine coming home from work in a bad mood - and beating a child in your care with a wooden broom-handle - until the child is bleeding from lacerations - and does not even have the strength left to carry on screaming.

Then - once you've finished - locking that child in the cupboard under the stairs until midnight.

By failing to even draw such crimes to the attention of the police - you may as well have been wielding that broom yourself.

Or - perhaps you are a politician - who has denigrated the police investigation - tried to undermine the police leaders - or - as is referred to in this ACPO report - furnished manipulated and forged information to the Mail on Sunday, in a deliberate attempt to smear the enquiry.

You have misused your position - in order to protect people who take school boys out to sea on sailing boats, where there is no chance of the child being helped - and who then hold the boy's head over the side of the boat under the water whilst anally raping them.

Perhaps you are a senior civil servant - who is aware that senior colleagues from other departments are deliberately concealing child abuse - and you choose to support and protect your friends in such conduct.

Imagine walking down a dark lane one evening - and hearing the screams of a child being molested. You know it's happening - you even know which house it is taking place in - but you hurry on by - pretending that you didn't hear that suffering.

Or - perhaps it comes into your knowledge - that a member of your staff - in the department you manage - has been sexually abusing a teenage girl in his care, and has caused her to become pregnant. Not only do you not inform the police - even worse - you confront the employee - but not to sack him on the grounds of gross misconduct; instead you tell him you'll let him resign and leave quietly - in order to avoid any inconvenient fuss - thus enabling him to go and work elsewhere where he can carry on abusing other children.

You may as well have pimped under-age girls to that abuser.

Imagine you are a Data Protection Commissioner and you are abusing your powers to oppress politicians who are trying to fight against child abuse.

It may as well be you - who is knowingly protecting a middle-aged man from discovery whilst he forces little girls to masturbate him.

Or - perhaps you're helping your establishment friends - to conceal their culpability for letting-off a man who is - obviously - an evidenced mass-murdering psychopath.

You may as well have been going around that hospital ward - at 3.00 in the morning - detaching patients' drips - and overdosing them with heroin.

You might be a politician - who thought no further than the partisan political support of your allies - and the doing-down of your opponents - and therefore you voted to stop a colleague from exposing child protection failures.

Imagine you - yourself - being responsible for keeping a mentally ill 14 year old - locked up in solitary confinement - where he has a mental breakdown - and routinely lacerates his arms through self-harm - whilst he lays on a mattress on his cell floor for 23 hours a day.

And you keep him in those conditions - for three months.

Or perhaps you are a lawyer - and close friends with the Attorney General - who pays you with public money to politically oppress opposition politicians.

You are directly supporting and maintaining the climate of fear - and the Culture of Concealment - that will continue to embolden mass-murders - and child rapists - in the committing of their crimes.

Or - perhaps you are a judge; a judge who knows perfectly well that Jersey harbours a Culture of Concealment - in which the grossest of abuses - and of social services failures - are allowed to persist - with those responsible enjoying some kind of absolute invulnerability - which ensures they can never be held to account for their gross incompetence.

But even though you have that knowledge - you abuse your powers to participate in the overt oppression of those who were trying to combat the culture of secrecy and the lack of accountability.

Your actions are equivalent to those of a political tyrant who wishes to conceal the failures of his regime - so he sends around thugs to beat-up his opponents - to "make an example" of them - to maintain the climate of fear.

Or - perhaps you are a journalist - and you are provided with damning evidence that shows that many gross crimes against children were able to be committed over a period of years - not only without being reported to the police, but even with the victims being bullied into not complaining.

You do not take steps to have the information published - because your bosses and your friends wouldn't like it.

You may as well have stood and watched - whilst those boys were made to become helplessly intoxicated - and then sexually molested - whilst the abusers filmed their crimes.

Actions - and inaction's - and consequences.

And not merely abstract theorising - but a disturbingly close match to the actual events.

Cause - and effect.

It is famously written that all that is required for the triumph of evil - is for good people to do nothing.

But the dreadful reality of the Jersey Child Abuse Disaster is worse than that.

The Culture of Concealment - and the climate of fear that enables all such atrocities to persist - does not come about only because "good people do nothing". Instead - its existence is pro-actively helped and nurtured - through an accumulation of small acts of ethical bankruptcy - of evil - of cowardice - that - cumulatively - bring into existence an act of monstrous wickedness that is something greater than the sum of its parts.

Yet - how many of those contributory individuals - those culpable people - see their own weakness and solipsistic inadequacies - for what they are - component-parts in a greater atrocity which would not be able to exist if it were not for their participation?

Acts - and consequences.

As Dylan Thomas wrote:

"The hand that signed the paper
Felled the city."

Stuart.

ASSOCIATION OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS

REPORT 3/4

Operation Rectangle: Haut de la Garenne, Jersey

Historical Child Abuse investigation and possible homicide case

Update of previous recommendations

Recommendation 1: That an agenda is prepared for this (and any other meetings) and a minute taker records the salient points and any decisions.

From the 4th March 2008, Vickie Ellis has been appointed minute taker and every meeting has an agenda and a record is maintained. Copies of the minutes are not yet retained on the Holmes account. This should be addressed and the deputy SIO has been reminded of this requirement.(26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 2: That the deputy SIO (Detective Inspector Keith Bray) provides an update of any points of interest that includes – the MIR, the Outside Enquiry Team, Analysis and Intelligence Cell. In key areas, consideration should be given to inviting any colleagues responsible for these areas of the investigation.

DI Bray attends the management meetings and provides a current situation report. This is also provided to both the outside enquiry team and the MIR; a copy of all reports are held on Holmes as ‘other documents’. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 3: That the SIO considers a mechanical process for sifting the debris.

On the 4th March 2008, a mechanical sifter was borrowed from the Counter Terrorist Command at New Scotland Yard. It was in place on the 5th March in one of the sifting areas at Haut de la Garenne. The team saw this being used and it has speeded up the process. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 4: That the three exhibit sites be detailed in the policy book. That the Crime Scene Manager provides a statement that details the exhibits and could include a time line, e.g. ‘these are the exhibits and could include a time line, e.g. ‘these are the exhibits recovered at the Haut de la Garenne care home between the 1st January 2008 and the 1st March 2008. The examination of the scene has not been completed and further exhibits will be correctly recorded and submitted at appropriate periods.’

The SIO has entered a policy decision on the 3rd March. The exhibits at Haut de la Garenne are retained at a secure area and the Scene Manager retains an exhibit book and log. She will provide a full statement giving account control and movement. The Exhibits Officer retains control of all other exhibits and retains a record of movement on Holmes. The documents and files in ‘the cage’ are exhibited in batches. When specific papers are removed they are sub-exhibited as required with a full record on Holmes. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 5: That the SIO review this position and seeks advice from his trained Family Liaison Co-ordinator and through Detective Sergeant Teresa Russell NPIA, seeks advice from Detective Constable Duncan McGarry (NPIA).

On 20th March Duncan McGarry visited the MIR. He was apprised of the FLO policy from DS Dave Hill (the Office Manager). He gave advice on an FLO strategy, best practice and exit policy for victims. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 6: That the SIO ensure that his policy for presenting victims’ evidence to the courts is recorded in the policy log.

On 18th March the SIO recorded this policy in his policy/decision log. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 7: The SIO should consider whether all residents will be interviewed (or not)?

On 18th March, the SIO recorded the policy that not all victims will be interviewed as a matter of course. They will only be interviewed if they come forward and are victims or witnesses of material evidence. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 8: The SIO should consider a policy for dealing with such victims and record it as a matter of policy.

See above (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 9: The SIO should discuss Wateridge with the Prosecuting authority.

On 15th March the SIO met with the Force legal advisor, Lawrence O’Donnell. They discussed Wateridge. He is to be re-interviewed week commencing the 24th March regarding other allegations and offences. All parties are content with this way forward. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 10: The SIO must detail any arrest strategies in the Policy Files.

On 19th March, the SIO detailed his arrest strategy in his policy/decision log.(26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 11: The SIO should ascertain from the proper authorities, and recover, any records or files of people who worked at the home (following advice from the data protection officer).

The head of Social Services, Tony Le Sueur, provides full access to any files required. The enquiry team has immediate access to the files and can remove any on receipt. This process is intelligence led; in that, as the intelligence cell identifies a former worker of interest a call is made and the files searched for and recovered against receipt. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 12: The SIO must set strategies for contingencies of victims and suspects harming themselves and the likelihood of suspects fleeing to other countries.

All victims and suspects are risk assessed by the officer who has the action to deal with the individual. On 25th March, the deputy SIO has provided Special Branch with details of all suspects for tracking of movement if they attempt to leave Jersey. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 13: That the Chief Officer maintains a safety zone between the investigation and any demands of politicians.

The chief of Police has maintained a role in updating Jersey’s politicians and wider community. An article interviewing him in The Jersey Evening Post regarding his Annual Report of 2007 has also included aspects of Operation Rectangle. It is understood that he has received a statement including allegations of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and other offences. He will seek independent legal advice regarding these allegations. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 14: That the key members of investigation team consider the offer of specific mentors from this team.

This is on-going and the key members of the enquiry team have welcomed and taken the opportunity to seek advice from their respective mentors. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 15: That the SIO, deputy SOI and Office Manager have clear demarcation of their roles and adhere to them.

As of 10th March, when PNICC provided additional resources on mutual aid, the three key members of the enquiry work to their specific roles detailed within MIRSAP. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 16: That the Chief Officer considers appointing someone to temporarily undertake the duties of deputy chief officer.

On 10th March, Sean Du Val was appointed Deputy Chief Officer. He undertakes all the functions within that rank leaving the SIO to concentrate on Operation Rectangle. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 17: That the Chief Officer and SIO consider a Community Impact Assessment and convene an Independent Advisory Group. The IAG should not include former residents of this home, could include advisors from the NSPCC or community groups. The IAG could advise on the CIA.

On 19th March, a Community Impact Assessment was completed. The first meeting of the Independent Advisory Group was held on 13th March 2008. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 18: The media officers should put together an internal media process and ensure it is kept current.

On 7th March, an internal document was drawn up and made available to all staff. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 19: That other accommodation is found for the enquiry team and that the MIR is extended to the current room used by the enquiry team. This may allow the Document Reader/OM/Deputy SIO to use the current MIR for work that requires a quieter environment. States of Jersey Police recognised this from the upsurge in calls over recent days and are in the process of addressing this matter.

On 10th March, the MIR took over the two rooms of the MIR and the outside enquiry team moved into separate accommodation on the second floor of police headquarters. In three or four week’s time a new MIR will be made available in Broadcasting House – a nearby police rented building. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 20: That the call centre phones are located elsewhere and have a ‘relevant’ number of dedicated call-takers with appropriate skills. This call centre can be staffed during office hours and have a suitable answering machine for other times. This will fluctuate depending on the media coverage etc, but best practice is to enhance numbers initially as it’s then easier to stand people down. This call centre should include child abuse trained officers.

On 17th March, a dedicated Call-Centre with two staff, one a member of the enquiry team and another a member of the NSPCC was located in the enquiry team’s office. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 21: Through Mutual Aid a dedicated experienced Receiver and a dedicated experienced Action Manager are found for the MIR. (These roles may, at some time in the future, be able to be combined when the incident volumes settle down). Additional typing staff should also be identified and posted to MIR.

From 10th March, a Receiver, Action Manager, two Readers and additional typists were dedicated to MIR. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 22: The Deputy SIO should review the Actions queues on behalf of the SOP to focus the MIR to the relevant lines of enquiry. The Deputy SIO should undertake this review with a dedicated Action Manager over the course of a day or two, this would allow the number to be dramatically reduced to relevant Actions with the remainder being put to ‘For Referral’ or ‘Referred’. It should be noted that they would still be searchable in those queues should they become relevant as the enquiry continues. This would assist to ‘clear the ground’ from under their feet to allow a clearer focus on what Actions are relevant.

The Deputy SIO and Office Manager now have a regular QA system in place (see recommendation 42). (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 23: That there should be assurance that all of the good work being done for the enquiry at the various locations and countries is captured via relevant documentation associated to the incident Actions. For example the work by the search dog; the work by the Archaeological digs etc. One option may be to feed synopses of work being done by experts into the MIR via the coordinating SOCO which should be controlled via Actions. Such documents could be ‘living documents’ on a daily basis to be typed up. This would form a good source of intelligence/update information for the SIO rather than having to rely on minutiae detail from each and every area.

This is now in place and the SIO is updated at management meetings regarding this action. (26.3.08)Completed.

It is suggested that an SIO (Andy Tattersall GMP) with previous experience of such abuse cases together with a Disclosure expert (Ian Lloyd or Graham Marshall, West Midlands Police) are invited through Teresa Russell to apprise and advise the best way to do this that will comply with Disclosure advice, best practice and regulations.

On 17th March Andy Tattersall visited the enquiry and met with key members of the team. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 24: That all policy files are recorded on the Holmes account.

The non sensitive policy files were already on Holmes and are available for the team to see. (26.3.08) sensitive policy files are retained in hard copy only. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 25: The SIO should consider this issue in any risk assessment conducted on the victims as well as the suspects.

See Recommendation 12 above. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 26: Consideration should be given to investing in both a full HOLMES system for States of Jersey Police and the requisite training for staff.

A report has been submitted to the Home Affairs minister. (26.3.08)

Recommendation 27: That the States of Jersey Police consider all the recommendations and take appropriate action. It is suggested that this team returns to Jersey in four weeks time to revisit any recommendations, the enquiry and make further recommendations as appropriate.

This recommendation is complete. (26.3.08) Completed.

Recommendation 28: That the SIO considers a scoring matrix to manage and prioritise the arrests of suspects.

The SIO decided not to adopt a scoring matrix (log 8 in Persons of Interest/Suspect Policy). However in log 9, he does decide to prioritise the suspect list and to take no further action against others. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 29: That the SIO considers appointing lead officers for each suspect and they maintain a structured investigative log for each of their designated suspects.

Each Person of Interest and / or suspect is allocated to a team for research and progression. The team are also responsible for maintaining the structured investigative log that is also recorded on the Holmes account. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 30: That Detective Inspector Alan Williamson, the Family Liaison lead for States of Jersey Police, creates and implements a family liaison strategy in accordance with the advice from DC McGarry.

Detective Constable Alex le Chevalier (Jersey police) and Raymond Alexander (NSPCC) are dedicated to this role. They are putting together a FLO strategy which will be utilised on a case by case basis. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 31: That the Crime Scene Manager and SOCA for Jersey brings this issue to the attention of LGC management.

There has been confusion over the provenancing and carbon dating of this exhibit. This has been exacerbated by the Mail on Sunday article on 18th May 2008, where forensic analysts involved have spoken directly to the media. This will be subject of a further recommendation that the States of Jersey Police raises this breach of confidence with the National Police Improvement Agency. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 32: That once the provenance of the piece of skull is known, the SIO decided and decision logs the continuance or not of the homicide investigation.

Even though there is confusion regarding this exhibit, from the context in which it was found the SIO has been informed that it is from the 1920s. With regard to that item he has declared that it is not part of a homicide investigation. However, with recent finds of cut bone, charred pieces of bone and full milk teeth, he has declared this an unexplained death or deaths and once there is confirmation around the date of the death (s), he will decide whether this is a homicide case.(23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 33: If not a homicide, the SIO seeks advice as to how to deal with the piece of bone.

The SIO is retaining this exhibit. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 34: If there is no homicide at Haut de la Garenne the case remains a complex historical abuse investigation, the SIO should then consider declaring it a critical incident and instigate police supporting that decision. Discharged. (23.5.08)

Recommendation 35: A forensic strategy must be drawn up to cover all exhibits that have been recovered for comparison against victims and the UK database.

See recommendation 56 (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 36: The SIO must obtain forensic advice regarding the recovered bones from the scene.

See recommendation (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 37: Through Theresa Russell, NPIA, the SIO seeks the advice of Adrian West with regard to a sensitive media appeal for reluctant witnesses to come forward and report crimes.

The SIO has considered this recommendation and is satisfied with the strategy in place for encouraging victims to come forward. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 38: That the SIO considers a strategy to encourage workers at the home to provide evidence.

The SIO has made such media appeals. This recommendation will be reconsidered if the findings of bones and teeth lead to a homicide investigation. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 39: All risk assessments must be quality assured and supervised by the deputy SIO.

The deputy SIO is supervising the risk assessments. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 40: The SIO seeks an experienced Receiver – ideally be Monday 31st March 2008. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 41: In conjunction with the advice from Andy Tattersall, if the enquiry is a complex historical abuse investigation, the SIO considers how best to sub divide the Holmes account to address individual suspects.

This is being undertaken and the suspects have been divided and designated to teams to progress. The disclosure officer is engaged on this process and further expert disclosure advice is being sought from Devon & Cornwall Police. (23.05.08) Completed.

Recommendation 42: Within seven days, a full review of the incident actions is made to assess and prioritise the work of the enquiry team. This will identify areas of priority to provide the SIO the best evidence available against suspects. This should be completed by Keith Bray and Dave Hill. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 43: That the Receiver receives and quality assures the returning actions from the Enquiry team. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 44: The SIO seeks a Receiver at the earliest opportunity. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 45: Following the review of Actions (see recommendation 41 above) the SIO reconsiders the staff requirements. (23.5.08) Completed.

Recommendation 46: The SIO should discuss medium to long term requirements with PNICC. (23.5.08) Completed.

1 Mentoring

1.1 The team continues to mentor the senior players on the enquiry. Unless there are any issues that come to light, e.g. a media report, the team, in the main, responds to the individuals making contact.

2 The Major Incident Room

2.1 The MIR and enquiry team have now moved to more appropriate accommodation in the Major Crime Suite at Broadcasting House. There is sufficient space for the number of staff on the team and there is some room for expansion.

3 The Holmes Account

3.1 The main Action queues are at 303 For Allocation, 460 Allocated, 13 Completed, 603 Resulted, 154 Filed, 2 for Referral, 621 Referred and 2 Pended. The referred Actions will be assessed again in the near future to ensure there are none that require to be moved back for allocation. A Detective Sergeant manages the enquiry team’s Actions, ensuring they return them in a timely manner. The Actions for Allocation are reviewed on a daily basis by the Office Manager and the Enquiry team leader.

3.1 The Review team attended an office meeting/daily briefing. It was noted that no official record was kept and, therefore, no record retained on Holmes. An ongoing document on Holmes will allow staff to keep updated with the investigation and allow any new staff to read in to the investigation.

Recommendation 47: That a record is kept and updated on Holmes of all meetings.

4 Disclosure/presentation of evidence

4.1 There are complex issues in relation to the ability to isolate certain documents for specific files in relation to suspects or accused persons within the incident. The disclosure officer is to engage the support of an experienced Disclosure officer from Devon & Cornwall.

4.2 To assist with the presentation of these complex cases at court, it is recommended that computer generated graphics be used.

Recommendation 48: That the SIO considers computer generated graphics for presenting the cases at court.

4.3 Witnesses who are victims are initially interviewed on audio tape and then a written statement is prepared and signed. The deputy SIO wants to quality assure that the accounts given between the audio and written records to not differ.

Recommendation 49: That the Disclosure Officer and the teams responsible for managing the individual cases, a comparison between the audio and written records is conducted to ensure that there are no discrepancies.

5 Intelligence/Analysis

5.1 It is known that some victims were abused by more than one person and that a number of the abusers assaulted numerous victims. The analyst should interrogate all the evidence and provide charting of the abusers and abused children, together with time lines. This will assist interviews, prosecutors and presentation at court.

Recommendation 50: That the analyst prepares charts of abusers and abused children, together with timelines.

6 The homicide Investigation

6.1 Since the last visit, the sifting at the scene has unearthed some 30 fragments of bone and seven teeth. A definitive forensic analysis of all the samples is incomplete. It appears however, that one bone is a piece of a female child’s tibia. Additionally, some of the bones have been cut and some of the milk teeth have long roots, suggesting that they did not naturally fall out. The initial views from expert examinations are that these bones and teeth originate from two children. These facts indicate an unexplained death or deaths and it is appropriate that the investigation continues to pursue what happened to the children. A decision as to the enquiry being a homicide investigation (and the protocols of a homicide investigation should be adhered to until a decision is made) depends on the dates of the deaths. If they died too long ago a homicide investigation may not be pursued. The SIO has intimated that if the children died post war a homicide investigation will be undertaken. The SIO will then review the resource requirements to conduct both the homicide investigation and the on-going complex child abuse investigation.

7 Victim(s) of homicide/unexplained death

7.1 The partial bones and milk teeth will be forensically examined for many reasons, one being for identification of the children. The best advice must be obtained to ensure all forensic opportunities are pursued in this endeavour.

7.2 There will be a very demanding challenge to identify who the dead children could be, and this will require extensive work to obtain registers and records of the residents at the Home. Annually, there were 250 children in Jersey’s care system (based on annual reports). The analyst has commenced this work and he has identified that on any one day, between the period of 1957 to 1986, 55 children were resident at the Home. Residents at the Home included: runaways from the UK; children on remand; children for respite requirements; and children there for one night. If this work is required (both for a homicide investigation and or for a coroner’s hearing) additional resources will be required as researchers to assist the analyst.

Recommendation 51: That if a full list of children is required, additional researchers are identified to assist the analyst.

8 Victims of child abuse and witnesses management

8.1 The deputy SIO has overseen a review of all the victims, identifying those that had been abused within the offence parameters set by the SIO. There are now 116 victims of child abuse that meet the criteria, whom have come forward to report crimes committed against them at the Home.

8.2 The newly appointed Family Liaison Co-ordinator is being ably assisted by a colleague from the NSPCC. They are putting together a strategy to oversee the needs of the victims. This will include a risk assessment model and the Review Team will meet with them and discuss the risk models that are available and may be of value for this purpose. They are considering how to keep the victims updated throughout the enquiry and court process including, best practice from the witness care service in UK courts, refreshing the telephone helpline and they should also consider a website with secure individual passwords for victims to be updated.

Recommendation 52: The FLC and NSPCC team should consider processes for keeping victims updated throughout the investigation and court process.

9 Scene Management

9.1 The Office Manager confirms concerns with regard to the Action management of the work going on at the ‘scene’. These centre around:-

a lot of work is being done at the Home which harvests a large number of exhibits. There appears to still be a ‘disconnect’ between the MIR and the scene management of exhibits;

lack of document flow from the Home to MIR;

lack of control via Actions of work being done at the scene.

This issue is important for many reasons and even more so with the discrepancies of forensic examinations and further exhibits being found.

Recommendation 53: The SIO reviews his decision to allow the Crime Scene Manager to retain exhibits at the Home and complete one statement at the conclusion of the scene being searched. All relevant documentation regarding the enquiry (including those at the Home) must be put on Holmes. This should be further considered by the forensic reviewers as detailed at recommendation 56 below.

9.2 A potential second extensive scene has been identified by victims of child abuse. One of these witnesses has stated that they saw a child’s body in the confines of this new scene. The SIO has taken physical and technical measures to protect the area whilst at the same time ensuring that the general public are not alerted to police interest in the area. The SIO must ensure that measures are taken not to cross contaminate the two scenes and that a full strategy is undertaken to forensically search this second scene.

10 Forensic Strategy

10.1 Articles in the Mail on Sunday (18.5.08) and the Daily Mail (19.5.08) criticised the SIO and the investigation, focusing on the forensic processing. This specifically relates to the first piece of ‘skull’ found at the Home. The articles were followed by some criticism in political circles. The Review team immediately saw the damage this has caused to some of the investigation team and sapped their morale. The political criticism is extremely unhelpful and, if leaked will fuel the media comments and will divert the investigation, Of course, political players have every right in the public’s interest to question efficiency and effectiveness of the investigation but this does not include ridiculing members of the team.

Recommendation 54: That the Chief Officer of States of Jersey Police considers raising what the politician has done with the appropriate authorities.

10.2 The article in the Mail on Sunday included quotes, interviews and a photograph of scientist employed in the forensic processing of a particular exhibit. This was without the SIO’s authority.

Recommendation 55: That the Chief Officer of States of Jersey Police discusses this breach with LGC and they raise this issue with Tony Lake, portfolio holder for forensic issues in ACPO.

10.3 The Review Team feel it is appropriate to have an independent forensic review to look at the whole forensic process from when the exhibit is recovered through to the completion of the forensic examination(s).

Recommendation 56: That an Independent Forensic review be conducted by a team identified by the NPIA. Consideration should also be given to have all key players at a table-top forensic exercise.

10.4 Whilst visiting the Home, the Review Team was informed that Vicky Coupland, the Crime Scene Manager, was at the scene of a fatal fire. She will, no doubt, attend to many aspects of cross contamination that could be alleged or possible contamination of the charred bones found at the Home.

11 Suspects and Persons of Interest

11.1 The Deputy SIO has reviewed the list of suspects and persons of interest. There are 12 suspects and they are each managed by a pair of officers within the enquiry team and they are responsible for researching, collation of evidence, risk assessments and planning of arrests. There are some 30 other persons of interest who will be assessed as and when the weight of evidence against them becomes clearer. A decision will then be made to categorise them as suspects or listed for no further action. The deputy SIO has already reduced the list of suspects and persons of interest by undertaking the review.

12 Arrest Strategies

21.1 It is understood that one person to be arrested was possibly abused at the Home and later became an abuser whilst a teenager at the Home. The advice of a clinical psychologist must be obtained before he is arrested.

Recommendation 57: That the advice of a clinical psychologist be obtained through Teresa Russell, NPIA.

13 Resources

13.1 We spoke to a number of the enquiry team members. They are very content with the new accommodation and feel they are kept apprised of the investigation process through daily briefings/office meetings. They are not on excessive hours and are not receiving allowances under the Hertfordshire agreement.

13.2 It is understood that the deputy SIO and the Crime Scene Manager are still required to undertake on call duties in the Island. The deputy SIO was engaged over the last weekend on an allegation of serious sexual assault and the Crime Scene Manager was called out to a fatal fire on the 21st May. There are other officers available to cover on call for serious crime. The demands from Operation Rectangle on these two key individuals, is extremely high, especially so with the issues of recovery of exhibits and the need to keep a consecutive record and feed of documents to the MIR.

Recommendation 58: That the States of Jersey Police ensures that the key staff on Operation Rectangle are deployed full time on the investigation and other personnel are deployed for on-call duties in Jersey.

Recommendation 59: That the temporary Deputy Chief Officer and head of CID considers and draws up contingency plans in case another major incident occurs in Jersey.

13.3 The SIO travelled to Sheffield to meet forensic experts with regard to the recent discovery of bones and teeth. No doubt there are sound reasons for him to travel but he should empower other members of the enquiry team to undertake such roles.

13.4 The Ops Management have asked for States of Jersey police officers to be returned from operation Rectangle to other duties in the Island. They suggest as staff from the UK are deployed on the operation, their own staff should be made available for deployment on other Jersey policing requirements. The request is understandable but key roles on the enquiry must be from Jersey. They know the powers, the systems, the processes and can meet the long term requirements of such a complex enquiry. It is particularly important as they move into the arrest phase.

Recommendation 60: That key roles on the enquiry must be from the States of Jersey.

13.5 The Ops Management also have some concern that any staff ‘back filling’ States of Jersey Police Officers on everyday policing demands will not be paid for by the finances being made available for the Haut de la Garenne requirements. These are indirect costs.

Recommendation 61: That the States of Jersey Police ascertain the correct position on recompense payments for back filling staff on operation Rectangle.

13.6 Staff from the UK are seconded to the enquiry for periods of around three months or less. Issues of continuity and reading in to the enquiry are obvious. Some staff are willing to be deployed for longer periods than three months. Staff with background in child protection, homicide investigation and MIR support should be provided for the enquiry.

Recommendation 62: That States of Jersey Police discuss with PNICC, the possibility of a more flexible approach to periods of secondment to the enquiry.

13.7 The Review Team have taken the opportunity to speak to a number of the staff on the enquiry. The staff from the UK are still unclear as to their police powers whilst in Jersey.

Recommendation 63: That the States of Jersey ascertains the position with regard to police powers for seconded officers from the UK and that clarity is given to the position for each and every individual whilst they are deployed in Jersey.

14. Finance

14.1 The Review team have been asked to comment as to whether an SIO should consider financial implications of an enquiry. This has been asked as, it is understood, the SIO commented that he had considered costs and expenditure, reported in the media. This article was queried by e-mail sent to the chief officer and another party in Jersey. The SIO will be neglecting his or her duty if they did not consider costs and resources of an enquiry. This includes from the overall costs and value, against public interest of mounting an investigation, e.g. the offences are very old and dated and the public expectation may be that there is no or limited value in prolonged investigation, to unit overtime costs for administrative enquires.

Recommendation 64: The SIO must continue to consider and record expenditure, costs and resource demands of any enquiries.

15: The Independent Advisory Group

15.1 The IAG has now met on four occasions. The Review Team have seen the first three sets of recorded minutes of the meetings. Care must be taken to ensure that the minutes are an accurate record of what is said. An example being reference to ‘skull’ at the bottom of the first page in the third meeting (18th April 2008). Any inaccuracies must be corrected.

15.2 The fifth meeting is planned for next week. The SIO must ensure he brings the group up to date with all the issues that have been aired in public and any other foreseeable issue that may be raised. The IAG are there to be a community sounding board and expert advisory group of the investigation – they are critical friends and provide checks and balances for an investigation.

16 Succession planning of the SIO

16.1 The current SIO is to retire from the States of Jersey Police in September 2008. In reality he leaves the Island on the 11th August 2008. A successor is required – the investigation into the complex child abuse and possible homicide is at a crucial stage. Succession planning for the SIO must be addressed at the earliest opportunity. Some possible options for the position of SIO, includes:-

To ask the current SIO to delay his retirement or take up a contract to continue as the SIO.

To appoint the deputy SIO as the SIO.

To have the replacement Deputy Chief Officer be the SIO.

To have another senior officer in Jersey become the SIO.

To ask the ACPO HWG to appoint someone from the Review Team (their parent organisation must also be asked).

To ask the ACPO HWG to advise on a suitable SIO from the UK.

To have a retired UK or Jersey officer contracted as the SIO.

To have an SIO contracted from a company that supplies such, e.g. RIG.

16.2 The Review Team have worked on criteria and skills that a successor requires.

Recommendation 65: That the Chief Officer States of Jersey Police convenes a meeting to discuss the succession planning for the SIO, at the earliest opportunity (which this Review Team should be represented on). In the meantime, the Chief Officer should seek the current SIO’s views on his retention and his replacement.

17 Governance

17.1 The Chief Officer remains a buffer zone between the SIO and the politicians in States of Jersey. It is suggested that he retains this role for the foreseeable future.

17.2 The Attorney General has a nominated lawyer advising the investigation team. The review team are aware that files have been supplied to him seeking advice on arrests and extradition. Subject to any legal impediments, the designated lawyer must attend to the files and provide advice at the earliest opportunity. There are now two people charged and awaiting trial and 12 suspects being prepared for arrest and further enquiries. The designated lawyer has two files for consideration and will have more in the next few weeks.

Media

18.1 There is high media interest in the enquiry. The media are keen to keep the public informed and seek any new or high points for reporting. Additionally, some members of the media are keen to criticise the police, the authorities or any other aspect of the Home and Jersey. The media must be managed. Their value to keeping the general public apprised is important. The victims will be affected by what they see and hear, and the Review Team are aware that a victim of serious assaults over a prolonged period whilst resident in the Home, contacted the enquiry team to say she now wanted to make a statement. She has been reluctant in the past.

18.2 Subject to any high points of the investigation, the SIO, advised by the States of Jersey Press Officer, should consider holding press conferences in a controlled environment. The Review Team suggests that no one-to-one interviews are provided (unless the value is obvious) save for local Jersey media that a specific interest in the enquiry.

Recommendation 66: No one-to-one interviews be provided unless for Jersey media with a specific interest in the enquiry.

Andre Baker
Anne Harrison
John Mooney

23rd May 2008

ACPO HWG Review Team – Operation Rectangle

Visit – 28th June 2008 – 30th June 2008

Visit by A. Baker, A. Harrison, Jonathan Smith, Teresa Russell and Malcolm Boots.

Part of the team met with Lenny Harper, Alison Fossey, Vicki Coupland and Martin Grimes to discuss the Forensic Strategy and terms of reference for the Forensic Review.

A document was presented that details the summary for the forensic decision log. From the outset the forensic strategy was discussed at the enquiry’s management meetings and subsequently recorded in both the SIO’s logs and the Crime Scene Manager’s logs. The team have been advised on drafting a forensic strategy as a forward-looking document from the outset of an enquiry. The review team are aware there will be other scene(s) to be searched and examined for forensic opportunities and recovery.

Recommendation 67: That the management team complete forensic strategies for any further scenes identified. This should be a forward looking document that details the strategic direction for that scene examination.

2.1 The review team met with the SIO and deputy SIO and discussed the terms of reference for the forensic review. These have been agreed and presented to be signed off. Any report should be discussed with the ACPO HWG review team and the States of Jersey police. The forensic review should be made available to any full review if and when undertaken.

3.1 The SIO still awaits carbon dating and other forensic expert advice and conclusions. He is hopeful that these will be forthcoming in the near future and that he will be able to revisit the unexplained death/homicide question, and decide if the States of jersey Police are able to conduct a homicide investigation. If he is able to so decide, this will assist any successor as to the on-going strategy and conduct of Operation Rectangle.

3.2 However, the ACPO HWG team feel that a full review is commissioned to take stock and assist in the future strategy of the enquiry. Where an extensive number of staff or support has been provided by a specific force that force’s review tem should not be utilised.

Recommendation 68: That there is a full review of the investigation/enquiry. This must be conducted by a dedicated and experienced review team from either the Metropolitan Police Service or other UK police force review team. The terms of reference should be agreed by the States of Jersey Police, the new review team and the ACPO HWG team.

Recommendation 69: That once a decision has been taken with regard to the human remains – teeth and bones. The SIO must discuss a coronial hearing with the States of Jersey Coroner.

4.1 The Independent Advisory Group was set up to critically advise the SIO and enquiry team. The aim being that an independent party regularly meets the SIO and representatives to discuss the investigation and comment as to direction and value with specific aspects of community impact and considerations that affect the community.

4.2 It is understood, however that the IAG have asked the general public for their views on the investigation and general comment on such. This course of action could be reflected from both a negative and positive standpoint. Negative in that some of the respondents could have been pointed and a collective from a defendants’ group of associates – almost setting up defence ambush at trial, and positive, that the comments could have been a collective of law enforcement, politicians and the like to support the robust strategy of the investigation. The whole exercise might well be valueless, especially as the public have not been exposed to the vast majority of the lines of investigation.

4.3 The review team are also concerned that the IAG undertook this public poll without discussion and reference to the SIO.

5.1 The review team met with the Chief Officer and David Warcup – the DCO designate to discuss the options for succession planning of the SIO. The Chief Officer and DCO designate, expressed the value in retaining the expertise of the ACPO HWG. It was agreed that a seconded or contracted SIO will be selected by open advertisement and a process was agreed and is now in place. The ACPO HWG team will prepare a draft advertisement and will discuss their further involvement, in the selection and the enquiry, with David Warcup.

5.2 The line supervision of Operation Rectangle remains from the SIO directly to the Chief Officer. This will change on the appointment of the new Deputy Chief Officer – David Warcup, where he will provide the strategic direction and the acting SIO and newly appointed SIO will report directly to him.

Andre Baker
Anne Harrison

LETTER FROM EXILE: # 21

LOOKING INTO THE MICROCOSM
FROM REALITY.

Blanche Pierre –

The Anatomy of an On-going Atrocity.

Part 7.

Child Abuse –

And the Failures to Protect Children.

The Atrocities Continue.

"There was frequently delay in reporting matters to the Police. A case in which delay could have had fatal consequences was the case of the [Child, Family 4] baby (please see report DS Fossey [Date excised] folder 1) who was taken to A&E with a suspected fractured skull. Doctors were investigating this as a non-accidental injury and the parents were the sole carers and therefore the chief suspects. Children’s Service did not inform the Police. The Child was admitted at approximately 17.00 one day and Police were not informed until 13.00 the following day, and then, only by chance. In the meantime the child had been allowed home for the night with her parents. I am not an expert in child care but one only has to apply a modicum of commonsense to realise that the Police should have been informed at once and that the child should have been placed with someone other than her parents until investigations were complete. The next day, not one but two suspicious skull fractures were confirmed."

Bridget Shaw.

"I still find this hard to understand particularly as I successfully prosecuted [Mother, Child, Family 1] for neglect when she admitted allowing a known sex offender into her home on a daily basis and watched him indecently assault [Child, Family 1] on two occasions without intervening. When parents cannot or will not protect a child surely the state has a duty to act?"

Bridget Shaw.

"[Mother, Family 6] was a young single mother with a disturbed background. On [Date excised] she informed psychiatric nurse [Nurse A] that she had tried to kill her [Age excised] old baby by smothering him. She stopped in time. However, she felt that the baby was better off without her but as she did not want anyone else to have the child it would be better for him to die.

"The documents show that [Nurse A] informed Children's Service at once. However, Children’s Service did not inform the Police until 4 weeks later. In the meantime Children’s Service had agreed with [Mother, Family 6] that her father should care for the baby but they did not tell him what had happened. The grandfather was therefore not in a position properly to protect the child as he did not know either that the child was at risk or what that risk was. The Grandfather in fact took the baby with him on a visit to UK where [Mother, Family 6] joined them. No authorities in UK had any idea that the Child was at risk. Police were only informed 4 weeks after [Date excised] when the family returned to Jersey. One can only conclude that in this case there was an abject failure to follow basic procedures and in my view, the Child must have been put at risk by those failures."

Bridget Shaw.

What Has Happened?

How Has it Happened?

Why Has it Happened?

Since my term of Office was unlawfully terminated by the Jersey oligarchy, many, many members of the public in Jersey have e-mailed me to express their support – and to ask questions – always questions. Chiefly, the three I reproduce above.

In this posting – I will try to do two things. Answer those questions.

And – sadly – provide yet more damning evidence of the Jersey Child Abuse Disaster. Evidence which proves – that the recently published Special Case Review – into just one child protection failure – that caused outrage in Jersey – is only the tip of the iceberg.

The evidence I quote from above – with the full report, by Bridget Shaw, reproduced below – illustrates nine – yes – nine – further such atrocities.

And still – most of the awful truth is hidden.

A very successful American lawyer once remarked to me, as though letting me in on a trade-secret, how to tell which side was actually right – and which wrong, in a case of litigation. He said, "The lawyer who is making the case for the side who are right, will keep his argument very simple and clear. The lawyer representing the side who are wrong, will make his argument as complex as possible."

That was good advice.

Indeed, one often sees the same tactics used in politics.

Why should each side choose those stratagems? What advantage is offered by each to the respective positions?

If your case is fundamentally right – if you have truth on your side – a reasonable jury will see that that is so. You do not need elaborate complexities or stultifying legal arguments to prop-up your case. But, the other side – who are wrong – are simply wrong. Therefore any plain and easy statement of the facts disastrously undermines their position.

Which is why the side with the weak or non-existent case, will do everything and anything in their power to complicate, obscure, cloud – and divert attention from – the core, simple issues.

The party who is right – will combat this, by always striving to return the argument to the central, simple facts. Just as the party who is wrong – will continually strive to over-complicate matters – and introduce diversion – upon diversion.

There are risks – of course – in both approaches, to both sides.

The obvious risk is that the opposing tactic works, of itself - but a less obvious danger is that in adopting either strategy, you assist your opponent by driving the jury towards their side.

The side over-complicating matters, might succeed in their objective of making the jury lose track of the issues – of intimidating them into thinking, "we must be foolish and ignorant – not to understand such obviously brilliant and learned points. If such expert and highly-ranked people – who clearly know so much – say that the case of the other side is wrong – well, that must be so. Who are we, ordinary people, to disagree with such professionals? Anyway, surely such a controversial matter – that has ended in court, after all these years – just can't be as simple as the other side are claiming?"

But – against such a tactic – the simple argument may work; it may succeed in blowing away the clouds of confusions and obscurations. People's common sense instincts can be powerful; they may well smell that unmistakable scent of nonsense - and, instead, just see – and understand - the plain facts, and instinctively grasp the truth.

The risks to either side – in the responses they must make to the other, are clear. If you are on the 'complex' side – if you refuse to engage in a straight way with the simple facts, you risk appearing evasive – and your attempted delusion of the audience, that hocus-pocus you were trying to dazzle them with, may evaporate. And, if you are on the 'simple' side, a refusal to be drawn into any technical complexity or subtle nuance of argument can make your case appear intellectually weak.

The advice of that American lawyer returned to mind today, whilst I was answering the many e-mails of support I have received – and trying to think of how to answer the oft-repeated request from the many people who have not been following events closely, to explain –

"How did things come to this? How was all this able to happen? Why has it happened?"

I've answered those people by promising that I would try – somehow – to summarise and encapsulate the strange and bizarre course of events – which have led from early 2007 – to this unprecedented state of affairs.

I could, of course, write a very lengthy – and complexly cross-referenced – series of postings that referred readers back to this or that posting of such-and-such a date – and the evidence they contain. But – although I could do that – I've decided instead to try and keep it simple.

Simple – because the truth is on our side.

And – in addition to explaining the truth – I am going to publish the next item of evidence as part of our examination of the continuing Blanche Pierre Atrocity. And – in a coincidental and circular manner – the particular item of evidence, in addition to proving the continuing child protection failure in Jersey – takes us back to how these atrocities are able to be hidden – through the oppression of people like me – even though the truth is known to those in positions of power.

So – whilst not without its risks – I'm going to describe below – in simple, easily understood terms – the truth.

The reality – the disgusting Political manoeuvrings – the fearful abuses of power - which have caused, and continue to drive this extraordinary sequence of events.

I will explain – simply – why things happened as they did – and, in particular – just why certain early – catastrophic – misjudgements on the part of the Jersey oligarchy – have left them with no choice; left them chained into a course of action that they cannot now turn from – but which has, effectively, destroyed them.

In the case of the Jersey Child Abuse Disaster – a continuously unfolding failure, spread over decades – and, in particular, the events of the last three years, I am on the side that is right. I, and others like me, who have fought for the protections of children – can state our cases simply – make our arguments easy to understand – because we have the truth on our side.

In letter from Exile 13, in which I published the second ACPO report – I explained just how many items of actual hard, documented evidence there are, now in the public domain – that support our simple – and truthful – argument. Namely – that there has been a systemic, catastrophic breakdown in child protection in Jersey – and that that has been made worse, by a sustained campaign by the powers-that-be in the island, to conceal that long-term failure to protect children. Indeed, the items of evidence listed in Letter from Exile 13 have now been dramatically added to – by the evidence published in this series of postings examining the Blanch Pierre atrocity.

The truth is –

There has been a grotesque failure to protect Jersey's vulnerable children.

That failure has persisted over a period of many decades.

Many, many, highly-placed and influential people – such as senior civil servants, politicians, Law Officers and judges have been culpable in that failure – in one way or another – over the decades.

All of those people who are still living, whether still working, or retired, wish to conceal their respective roles in the failures.

Not only did individuals fail – the States of Jersey as an entity – the island's entire public administration – also failed – disastrously. Indeed – it continues to do so.

Therefore – even if it were not many of the same people of which we speak – still, the Establishment – wanting to maintain the "image" of the States of Jersey – has common cause with all of those culpable individuals.

That Common Purpose – between the States and individuals, is what gives rise to the Culture of Concealment.

Not only have we published dramatic quantities of evidence that shows many, many cases of child abuse – we have also published huge quantities of evidence which shows the deliberate concealing of that abuse.

Fortunately for vulnerable children – and unfortunately for all those engaged in the Culture of Concealment – three years ago, we began to expose the child protection failures.

The Jersey establishment panicked. At that moment – there were two paths available to them. One – the path of wisdom – recognise and acknowledge the failures; face up to them – and their consequences – and do the right thing. Or – the path of folly – carry on behaving as the Jersey oligarchy has always done – as an all-powerful law-unto-itself; re-enforce the Culture of Concealment; and abuse all powers to oppress, denigrate – and make an example of - anyone who dares to speak the truth and tries to do what's right.

Back then – in July 2007 – the States of Jersey committed itself to the path of folly.

Thinking it was only me, and a few other "troublemakers" who were exposing the child protection failures – the Jersey oligarchy set about oppressing and neutralising me – thinking that that would enable them to get the lid back down on the whole disaster.

By acting in such a foolish, improper and unwise manner, the Jersey oligarchy destroyed their credibility at that stage. But the full, awful magnitude of that disastrous conduct did not dawn upon them until we learnt, some months later, of the covert Police investigation into the decades of concealed abuse.

The police investigation went public, in late 2007 – to the profound fear, humiliation and discredit of the Jersey establishment. For not only was it shaming that Jersey had harboured such child protection failures for decades – but, even only a few months earlier, the first and only Jersey politician to have exposed such failures, had been politically oppressed for his efforts, by the Jersey oligarchy.

Though nothing but support for the police investigation could be expressed publicly - privately, senior establishment figures knew this turn of events to be politically disastrous for them. They viewed the Jersey elections – approaching towards the end of 2008, with huge trepidation. They hoped – somehow – it would have faded away by then. Of course – it didn't. So – as the election drew close – a crazed act of desperation – of utter folly – was called for.

Something would have to be engineered – to discredit the entire historic abuse investigation.

Something would have to be done – to make it appear to have been a fuss over nothing – and drive the voting public back towards the traditionalists – in time for the crucial election of 29 members of the Jersey parliament – which would take place on the 26th November, 2008.

In the preceding months, much thought had been given to manufacturing some nonsense for which to suspend or sack the man directly leading the investigation – Lenny Harper. But – he was retiring in any event – making any such action against him appear even less credible. There was only one thing left to do – only one target that would serve the purposes of spin, during that crucial period in the build-up to the 2008 Deputies election – the Police Chief, Graham Power.

Mr. Power was unlawfully suspended – without any warning – without due process – and on no grounds - or evidence – whatsoever – by Bill Ogley, the Chief Executive to the States, and a politician, then Home Affairs Minister, Andrew Lewis, on the morning of the 12th November, 2008.

This was a desperate, desperate gamble. But – one the Jersey oligarchy, in their hubris, imagined they'd get away with.

Thrusting Mr. Power into this position – they attempted to bribe him – by offering him his full pension and a monetary settlement – if he agreed there and then to go – to take 'early retirement' – and they told him they would give him 'half-an-hour' to 'think about it'.

Another catastrophic misjudgement – of the kind that can only be made by people wholly corrupted by too much power.

The Chief Constable, a formidable man - of impeccable professionalism and integrity told them he did not require any time to think about it – his answer was "no".

He remains improperly suspended to this day – whilst the Jersey authorities engage in ever-more transparently lunatic panics – to try and manufacture – post-event – some kind of weak and spurious "justification" for their Political and corrupt behaviour. All the while Mr. Power's real retirement looms – when he will become a free agent – and able to express his assessment of events.

But – back in November 2008 – that criminal and despicable action, had the desired political effect. The credibility of the investigation was trashed. The traditional Jersey oligarchy were made to appear respectable once again, in the eyes of many Jersey voters.

However – the truth was not so easily disposed of. Mr. Power continued to fight; Mr. Harper continued to support the abuse survivors, and – especially problematically for the Jersey oligarchy, used to total control over the island's "news" agenda, I continued to write my blog – publishing hard evidence that the local "accredited" media could have been safely relied upon to not publish. Even if they'd had the competence to obtain it.

But, Mr. Power and Mr. Harper were, effectively, going or gone. I remained the last great problem. The one remaining – and in many ways, most problematic – 'last-man-standing' from the exposing of the Jersey Child Abuse Disaster. Doubly-dangerous. For not only was I publishing a continuing flood of hard evidence that proves many of the abuses took place – and proves many of the cover-ups – additionally, as a non-establishment Senator – I was also a political threat to the Jersey oligarchy's monopoly of power. What to do?

Terminate both of these threats at the same time – by abusing the "law" to attack me – and, specifically, to attack me over the publishing of the blog. The perfect solution.

Early one morning in April 2009, I stepped from the front door, and began to walk across to my car. Three unmarked police cars sped up the drive – I understood instantly what was going down – and plain clothed police officers leapt from the vehicles and surrounded me. One grabbed my wrist and told me I was under arrest for alleged data protection law offences. He stated my rights and told me I would now be taken to the police station. I asked if I could at least put on a clean T-shirt. He and three others then walked me into the house. Whilst inside, I asked if I could see their search warrant. The arresting officer, said yes, and began to reach into his jacket pocket, but he hesitated, stopped and said "no – it would be shown to me down at the station."

The operation was co-ordinated from Police Headquarters by one Dave Minty. There were at least ten officers involved on the ground at my home. The six I had seen immediately, two additional search officers, and a further two who had been waiting in a van in the lane outside, equipped with helmets and one of those battering-rams that get used in drug raids, "should I have not left the house and it had become necessary to effect a forced-entry".

I was taken to Police Headquarters under arrest, and was held locked into police cells for seven and a half hours – the great majority of that time in a tiny, windowless cell on the ground floor, where, if I wanted to use the toilet, I had to ring a bell, and an officer would eventually come, and escort me to the lavatories before returning me to lock and key in the cell.

Throughout this time, the home I shared with my partner – also a politician - was ransacked by police officers – from top to bottom - including going through her children's bedrooms, all of their possessions and searching their computers. Searching all of my partner's possessions and her computers. Turning over furniture, including the sofas and chairs in the sitting-room. Tipping the kitchen bin out onto the kitchen floor. All of this was enthusiastically engaged in by the police – even though the office I used, where my computer and files were kept, was – obviously - in another part of the property. They turned that over as well.

The above search was undertaken without any search warrant existing. The arresting officer had simply lied to me, when he said I'd be given a copy at the station. The supposed "legality" of the search relying upon an emergency search power, for use at the time of unplanned arrests.

The search was – plainly – a criminal act. It was unlawful on the grounds of being an 'abuse of powers', of being 'disproportionate' and of being engaged in improperly, when the law that was allegedly being broken by me, actually stipulates a specific enforcement procedure – including the requirement to obtain a search warrant.

The only significant charges arising being two alleged data protection offences. I have been expressly denied effective legal representation. The only thing that was – eventually – conceded to me – six-months into the corrupt prosecution process – was an offer of an unpaid, legal aid lawyer, not of my choice. Even had I been prepared to accept such an inadequate offer – it came six months too late – when the die had been cast in many respects.

Notwithstanding these denials of my rights, I worked through months of increasingly absurd preliminary hearings, and with the voluntary help of an expert witness, assembled my defence case. The report to court by the expert in particular, was unarguable. It prove conclusively and damningly the validity of my public-interest disclosure defence. It became clear at this stage the Jersey oligarchy had given no serious consideration to the facts relevant to the case they had acted upon.

After several months of work on my defence case – and at virtually the last minute of the 11th hour – the prosecution lawyer, Stephen Baker, formerly of 7 Bedford Row, and a personal friend of William Bailhache, announced without warning at the end of another of the 'directions hearings' that I would now have to make an application to the court to have all of my defence evidence deemed "admissible". This was a straightforward act of procedural corruption on Baker's part – the evidence in question already being "admitted" to the court proceedings – as it had been disclosed to me by the prosecution – in the full knowledge that I was using it as the basis of a public interest disclosure defence.

The judge – Bridget Shaw – went along with this corrupt charade, pretending, along with Baker that the evidence was not already a part of the proceedings, and agreeing with him that there would have to be yet another directions hearing the next week – at which I would have to "make an application to the court" – to have the evidence necessary to prove my defence case – "deemed admissible".

Given that the Judge – Bridget Shaw – had, throughout every hearing, simply agreed 100% with Baker - and merely parroted everything he said – I realised then my involvement was futile.

I walked from the court – and, a few days later, left Jersey.

Those – then – are some of the key facts in a chain of events that began for me, early in 2007, when I began to discover the true nature and extent of decades of concealed child abuse in Jersey.

The corrupt, anti-democratic and lawless actions described above – have now led to the oppression of the rights of my constituents and my illegitimate exclusion from democratic Office.

I wrote above, that a number of, frankly crazed, misjudgements had chained the Jersey oligarchy into a course of action that they cannot now turn from – but which has, effectively, destroyed them.

Political disasters happen to power-groupings all the time. 'Why' – you may ask – 'can't the Jersey establishment just face facts, take it on the chin – and turn aside from the path of folly they are on?'

There are several answers to that question.

For example – whilst those in power can be observed meeting with various disasters in most, Western democracies – Jersey is different, in that it has no organised opposition – and no functioning independent media. Therefore those in power in Jersey are able to indulge in folly – without facing the challenge they would in a functioning democracy.

It is also the case that Jersey has no separation of powers – thus no effective checks and balances. In the island, even the judiciary is corrupted to Political purposes.

The stakes are immensely high – therefore – for that power-structure. It is – effectively – a single-party state. But – the admission of any catastrophic public scandal – such as the corrupt concealment of decades of child abuse – could permanently change the political landscape.

Those reasons are – of themselves – enough to explain the irrational and shamelessly overt misbehaviours of the Jersey authorities during the last three years.

But – there is another reason – a reason which is, actually, quite obvious – when you pause to think about the lawless and corrupt behaviours itemised above.

A reason why – the misjudgements of the leaders of the Jersey oligarchy – have caused this to be a 'Total War' – that can only end in complete victory – and utter destruction – for one side – or the other – so vast are the stakes.

It is this.

If people like Graham Power, Lenny Harper and me – win – then certain, immutable facts are acknowledged.

And the general, collective, acknowledgement of those facts – can only have one, final, destination.

The logic is inescapable – and there to be observed.

For a multitude of various crimes of - Conspiracy to Pervert the Course of Justice - and of - Misconduct in a Public Office – the following individuals will be jailed:

Michael Birt.

William Bailhache.

Bill Ogley.

Tom McKeon.

Mike Pollard.

Richard Jouault.

Linda Dodds.

Marnie Baudains.

Dave Warcup.

Mick Gradwell.

Frank Walker.

Terry Le Sueur.

Philip Ozouf.

Mike Vibert.

Stephen Baker.

Emma Martins.

Dave Minty.

Bridget Shaw.

Each and every one of those individuals has engaged in – in one way or another – at different times and in different capacities – in conspiracies to pervert the course of justice, and of acts of misconduct in a public office – in respect of the pro-active, deliberate, concealment of crimes of child abuse – and of crimes of the concealment of child abuse.

That list is by no means exhaustive. But each person that features in it – has the mens rea – and is faced with the evidence – necessary to be prosecuted, convicted – and jailed – for the offences they have committed.

And, of course, in the Jersey context – not only are we speaking of the shame and disgrace of those powerful individuals – we are also facing the utter destruction of the very thing – the very institutions – the very status quo – they were all seeking to protect when embarking upon their criminal enterprise.

Each, in some way, has – knowingly – and that is a crucial distinction – knowingly – with mens rea - acted in ways, and misused their powers, to support and further the cause of the criminal concealment of child abuse.

Such actions have been engaged in, in the capacities of Law Officers, senior civil servants, regulatory officials, members of the 2007 Jersey cabinet, senior police officers – and judges.

Those are some stakes.

But yet – that is the inescapable, logical destination – that defeat for the corrupt Jersey oligarchy leads to.

So – if you observe the crazed, and seemingly irrationally excessive – and ultimately destructive, actions of the Jersey authorities – and shake your head in puzzled wonderment at the persistence of such folly, of the heaping of misjudgement upon misjudgement – now you will understand why.

For them – losing is simply not an option.

This end – this total war – could have been averted – could even have been rowed-back from at certain stages, though that would have involved some sacrifices.

However – in the catalogue of errors that has been the Jersey oligarchy's conduct throughout the child abuse scandal – there are three disastrous misjudgements – three terminally suicidal actions – that there was never, really, going to be any recovery from.

Firstly, the decision by the Jersey cabinet – to join with the corrupt civil servants in the deliberate concealing of child abuse – and their engineering of my dismissal as a Minister.

Secondly, the - frankly insane – action of corruptly and improperly suspending the Chief Officer of the States of Jersey Police Force. A nationally respected Chief Constable and holder of the Queens Police Medal. And doing so – in support of, of all things – the sabotaging of a major child abuse investigation.

Thirdly, the crazed, Mugabesque, police-state arrest, searching and oppression of a prominent opposition politician. The theft of his constituents' private data, the denial of his human rights, the refusal to provide legal representation and attempts to prevent him from even adducing the evidence he needs to defend himself.

When, eventually, the reckoning comes – those three events will be looked back upon by history – as the three nails the Jersey oligarchy hung itself from.

And to remind ourselves of just why the fight cannot be given-up – of exactly why any decent person must wish this seen through to the end – we can turn to the next item of evidence.

The document re-produced below – is a report – written by no less a figure than Bridget Shaw.

In it – in addition to the general damnation of what passes for a child "protection" system in Jersey – she refers to no less than nine – nine – separate – horrifying – examples of child abuse.

And – each one of the nine examples referred to here by judge Shaw are note-worthy – because each and everyone is being referred to in the context of examples of disastrous failure by Jersey's child protection apparatus.

In recent times.

Indeed – amongst the cases Ms. Shaw refers to in her report – are at least three – three - that I had become aware of – in spite of the civil servants' obstructions, and through my own investigations – during early 2007.

The very kind of cases I had in mind – when I gave that fateful – honest – answer to the question I was asked in the Jersey parliament in July 2007 – in which I said I 'had no confidence in Jersey's child protection systems – and I was going to commission an external, independent inquiry'.

The answer that then led to people like Bill Ogley, Mike Pollard and Marnie Baudains – with the enthusiastic political support of Frank walker, Terry Le Sueur, Philip Ozouf and Mike Vibert – and with the "legal" assistance of Michael Birt, William Bailhache and Emma Martins – having my dismissal engineered for "undermining staff moral".

These being the self-same staff responsible for the things documented in Ms. Shaw's report – such as failures leading to the neglect, mis-care, battery, savage injury and rape – of many vulnerable children.

I have explained above – as requested by many members of the public – what happened – how it happened – and why it happened. Well – at least as far as those terms can be addressed - under such wretched circumstances. What goes through the minds of people like Bridget Shaw – when unlawfully persecuting me – I can't begin to address.

And the real question – just how my community can have found itself led into such madness – where child abusers and those who fail to protect children are defended – I am likewise still struggling with.

Stuart.

REPORT BY BRIDGET SHAW.

Children’s Service

Background

In January 2006 OS (now DI) Alison Fossey assumed responsibility for what is now the Police Public Protection Team (PPU) formerly known as FPT.

Dl Fossey began to present us with many more cases for advice than we had previously received from the Police. The number of prosecutions rose accordingly, indeed we have had some very successful prosecutions. However at the same time DI Fossey brought to my attention a number of issues concerning the way in which Children’s Service officers were dealing with cases.

These can be summarised as delay in referring matters to the Police; heavy reliance on Police to take action in cases where Children Service should be acting and fail to do so; lack of understanding of Children’s Services primary role in Child Protection; reluctance to apply for Care Orders or Emergency Protection Orders for fear of failing and poor handling of case conferences.

The main issues at the time were with the long term care team who run the Children’s Homes, not, I stress, anything to do with Greenfields, nor with any behaviour that could be considered criminal. It appeared to the Police that a number of members of staff did not appreciate the risks to children, did not act when they should to protect children and did not understand the respective roles of the Police and Children’s Service.

Action by Legal Advisers’ Office

I raised the matter with the Solicitor General and DI Fossey subsequently sent me a report in April 2006 (attached folder 1 together with schedule of investigations and Children’s Service chronologies)

My file note and my subsequent report to the Solicitor General outlining my concerns are also attached (folders 2 and 3).

Meeting with Police

On 8 June 2006 The SG and I met with DCI Bonjour and DS Fossey to discuss the issues ( please see folder 4).

Dl Fossey had brought to our attention a number of cases which were symptomatic of the standards apparently applied by Children’s Service such as shown by the [1], [2] and [3] family histories.

In many cases little seems to be done by Children’s Service to intervene when in view of the Police, Children’s Service should act. They rely too much on the Police and seem to think the Police can act when Children’s Service can’t - rather than the other way around due to the different standards of proof. Frequently when a case was referred to the Police, Children’s Service would ask what he Police were doing about it rather than taking action themselves. The details are in the attached reports.

There was frequently delay in reporting matters to the Police. A case in which delay could have had fatal consequences was the case of the [Child, Family 4] baby (please see report DS Fossey [date excised] folder 1) who was taken to A&E with a suspected fractured skull. Doctors were investigating this as a non-accidental injury and the parents were the sole carers and therefore the chief suspects. Children’s Service did not inform the Police. The Child was admitted at approximately 17.00 one day and Police were not informed until 13.00 the following day, and then, only by chance. In the meantime the child had been allowed home for the night with her parents. I am not an expert in child care but one only has to apply a modicum of commonsense to realise that the Police should have been informed at once and that the child should have been placed with someone other than her parents until investigations were complete. The next day, not one but two suspicious skull fractures were confirmed.

The second area of concern was that members of the long term care teams did not seem to know what their roles were vis a vis the Police. They seemed to think that it was for the Police to act primarily to protect children. The Police’s primary role is to investigate crime. In doing so they work alongside Children’s Service but too often Police found Children’s Service expected the Police to take action when they themselves did not act. They were reluctant to apply for Emergency Protection Orders or Care Orders, even in cases where children such as the [Family 1] children such as [Child, Family 1] appeared to be at considerable risk in her own home.

Another area of concern was the conduct of case conferences, which are meetings held between all agencies to decide whether a child should be put onto the Child Protection Register. This categorises children at the highest risk and a plan of intervention is formed. In the [Child, Family 4] case the chair of the conference was the parents’ former children’s service officer who was clearly not impartial. Other concerns specifically surrounded a Manager named Danny Wherry. He would, for example, start the conference by stating that he did /did not intend to put the child on the register. This was not conducive to an open discussion and joint working between the various agencies.

Mr Wherry also told Police that if a Child on the Register was reported as missing, he did not want the Children’s Service to be contacted about it out of hours — it could wait until the morning. Children are put on the register if they are thought to be at very high risk. One would have thought that Children’s Service would be just the people the Police need to speak to in order to help find a very vulnerable child late at night.

Meeting with Children’s Service

The SG and I met with Marnie Baudains and Tony Le Sueur, (a Children’s Service manager). They accepted that Case Conferences were not always handled well and said they were short of people in the island qualified to chair them (something Marnie is working to improve).

As far as the long term cases were concerned, they effectively said that the chronologies we saw reflected only part of the work that went on but admitted that cost was a factor in dealing with such families, they thought they would never get care orders as the bar is set too high and even if they applied, they would have to show that the care home was better than the family home, which wasn’t necessarily the case as they would struggle to place such children.

We were told that incidents such as the [Child, Family 4] baby case should not have happened and were exceptional.

We also brought up the case of Jason Hamon which came to light in [Date excised]. Hamon was convicted of sexual offences against girls (aged 12/13) and sentenced to three years imprisonment Before he was released he underwent a RAMAS assessment which assesses a person’s risk of committing further serious offences. He was deemed to be at high risk. He also expressed his intention to [ EDITED] This [EDITED] did not accept that he remained a risk (‘He has paid his debt to society etc ‘).  [EDITED] had an [Age excised] old daughter. Clearly, [EDITED]  was in no position to protect [EDITED] did not accept that he posed a risk of offending. Children’s Service did not intervene to protect the [EDITED].

Two years later, the almost inevitable disclosure was made to the Police that Hamon had been indecently assaulting [EDITED] from the moment he [EDITED] . This was a tragedy which could have been avoided. Hamon is now serving another prison sentence. Children’s Service said they were not able to establish that he was actually living at [EDITED] and denied it when challenged.

Overall they believed they were doing a good job but that they felt unable to apply for Court orders to take children into care as the standards set by the Court were very high and applications even in such cases as [Child, Family 1] were likely to fail. The driving factor behind these decisions seems too often to be whether Children’s Service have suitable accommodation for the child rather than whether the child is at risk of harm if he or she stays in the home.

I still find this hard to understand particularly as I successfully prosecuted [Mother, Child, Family 1] for neglect when she admitted allowing a known sex offender into her home on a daily basis and watched him indecently assault [Child, Family 1] on two occasions without intervening. When parents cannot or will not protect a child surely the state has a duty to act?

The Present Position

The view of the Police is nothing has improved since our meeting with Children’s Service. Indeed things have deteriorated as the problems were formerly to do with the long term care team and response from the emergency team had been good. Since then some members of the emergency team have left and things have not improved.

Delays in reporting matters to the Police and questionable judgement issues remain.

Delays

The delay in the [Family 4] case was clearly not an exception. There have been many instances in which there has been delay in informing the Police. A glaring example is the case [Child, Family 6] (folder 5). I no longer have the full file but I enclose copies of the documents showing a referral from Health to Children’s Service on [Date excised.]

[Mother, Family 6] was a young single mother with a disturbed background. On [Date excised] she informed psychiatric nurse [Nurse A] that she had tried to kill her [Age excised] old baby by smothering him. She stopped in time. However, she felt that the baby was better off without her but as she did not want anyone else to have the child it would be better for him to die.

The documents show that [Nurse A] informed Children's Service at once. However, Children’s Service did not inform the Police until 4 weeks later. In the meantime Children’s Service had agreed with [Mother, Family 6] that her father should care for the baby but they did not tell him what had happened. The grandfather was therefore not in a position properly to protect the child as he did not know either that the child was at risk or what that risk was. The Grandfather in fact took the baby with him on a visit to UK where [Mother, Family 6] joined them. No authorities in UK had any idea that the Child was at risk. Police were only informed 4 weeks after [Date excised] when the family returned to Jersey. One can only conclude that in this case there was an abject failure to follow basic procedures and in my view, the Child must have been put at risk by those failures.

Poor Judgment

Another recent example of what is wrong in Children’s Service is the case of the [Family 7] (folder 6). The letter on file is from Linda Dodds, a senior manager. The letter is self explanatory. The children were at so much risk that they were put on the Register in [Date excised] 2006. By [Date excised] 2007 Children’s Service had had no intervention in the family, and had not even completed a core assessment as mother would not co-operate. The suggestion then, is that the children should come off the register! Surely mother's refusal to let Children’s Service into the house and refusal to co-operate is all the more reason for concern for these children, not less. DI Fossey's reply is also attached.

Another example is the case of [Child, Family 8] (folder 7). This was brought to my attention last week. [Child, Family 8] has been fostered by a family since the age of [Age excised] . He is now, around [Age excised]. He has [Condition excised.] Recently he tried to strangle the [Age excised] year old son of his foster parents. Children’s Service seem only able to focus on what they think is best for [Child, Family 8]and are ignoring the need to protect the [Age excised] yr old in the family. They are adamant that [Child, Family 8] should not be prosecuted and should remain in the home. It was only the Police who asked in case conference what the mother's view was (she can no longer cope with him) and the effect on the [Age excised] yr old (very fearful he or his parents will be killed by [Child, Family 8] in their sleep). There are two children here and the Police have actually alleged that Mr McVey of Children’s Service has tried to mislead them about whether to prosecute firstly in omitting Dr Williams’ comments that [Child, Family 8] should be prosecuted from the minutes of the meeting and then writing to DI Fossey saying that CAMHS (i.e. Dr Williams) were of the opinion that prosecution would not be in [Child, Family 8's] best interest. This is a very serious allegation but the officer (DC Cornelissen) does not see what other interpretation he can put on the facts.

Yet another case earlier this year was Dennis Godwin. He was a convicted sex offender living [EDITED] and [EDITED] [Child, Family 9]. who has [EDITED] . [Child, Family 9] was assessed as having a [EDITED] although [EDITED] was [Age excised]. [Child, Family 9] [EDITED] Godwin was a sex offender. [EDITED] was unable to protect [EDITED] . Godwin slept in [EDITED]. Children’s Service knew he was a sex offender living with [EDITED]. They did not intervene. Godwin repeatedly raped [Child, Family 9] and even filmed two acts himself. He is now serving 12 years. Even after Godwin’s arrest Children’s Service would not remove [Child, Family 9] from her mother’s care, not because they didn’t appreciate [EDITED] to protect [EDITED] but because they didn’t have anywhere to put a Child with [EDITED] difficulties. This continued even after Godwin tried to contact [Child, Family 9] from prison and [EDITED] sent him photographs of [EDITED].

Williamson Enquiry

When the enquiry was set up I contacted the Solicitor General and asked whether I should speak to Mr Williamson about the concerns we had had about Children’s Service which led to our meeting last year. The SG said that I should do so. I was aware that the Police still had problems with Children’s Service and I spoke to DI Fossey who gave me the most recent examples of [Child, Family 7] and [Child, Family 8].

I would emphasise that I have no knowledge of the matters relating to the allegations Senator Syvret has made about Greenfields and I feel I have nothing to contribute to that aspect of Mr Williamson’s enquiry. However, the enquiry was set up to look at child protection in its widest sense and I felt under an obligation to bring the above matters to Mr Williamson’s attention, which, with the agreement of the SG, I did last Thursday.

Bridget Shaw