Saturday, 18 May 2013

EXTRACTS FROM ARMAGEDDON: # 3

COMMUNIQUÉS FROM THE APOCALYPSE.

Welcome to today’s Extracts from Armageddon - Communiqués from the Apocalypse  - #3 – a dispatch from the dividers – a blast from the bundles – a chorus from the case-law.
Stuart Syvret

EXTRACTS FROM ARMAGEDDON: # 3
“When considering the above-facts – the history – and all the supporting evidence – it is, frankly, remarkable - in light of Barclay & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice & Ors [2008] EWCA Civ 1319 (02 December 2008) – that the respondent authorities have failed to intervene to end the unlawful nature of the Jersey judicial function, and put in place a lawful system.

In the cited  case the applicants were seeking to challenge the promulgation of the Reform Law in the island of Sark on the grounds that aspects of that law were not compatible with the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Sark, like Jersey, is one of the British Channel Islands, and like Jersey, is a Crown Dependency, with the UK authorities having ultimate responsibility for good governance, the administration of justice, and human rights.

The case refers to the Sark “Seneschal” – the equivalent position in Jersey being the “Bailiff” – and the Sark legislature, “Chief Pleas” – the equivalent in Jersey being the “States assembly.” As with the Seneschal in Sark, in Jersey the Bailiff is chief judge, and president of the legislature.
In the above-cited Court of Appeal judgment, the appellants were unsuccessful on four of the five grounds of appeal. However – and crucially – they succeeded on a fifth.

The successful ground – “Ground 2” in the application and judgment was: -
(2) The functions and powers of the Seneschal under the Reform Law breach Article 6 of the Convention, in particular his dual role as President of Chief Pleas and Senior Judge on Sark.
It should be noted that the unsuccessful respondent  - the Secretary of State for Justice – against who Ground 2 was upheld, chose not to appeal that decision.

In light of that unchallenged judgment - the current judicial function of Jersey is unlawful.
In the Court of Appeal judgment, the lead Judge – Lord Justice Pill – in paragraph 52, found:

“The Seneschal's position as Chief Judge must be seen in the context of his duties in Chief Pleas and also the existence of the power to make other judicial appointments for Sark.”
Having described the context – that of the “Seneschal” being both the speaker of the Sark legislature – and being the head of the judiciary in Sark – Lord Pill went on to address the legal issues.

“57: Whatever the outcome of ground 1, it is submitted that the Seneschal's position as judge is inconsistent, in Article 6 terms, with his legislative and executive duties. His influential political position, it is submitted, will inevitably and legitimately arouse in litigants appearing before him fears about his independence and impartiality.
58: In Starrs v Ruxton [2000] JC 208, Lord Prosser, considering the position of temporary sheriffs in the administration of justice in Scotland, stated, at page 232:
"But I am inclined to see independence – the need for a judge not to be dependent on others – as an additional substantive requirement, rather than simply a means of achieving impartiality or a perception of impartiality. Independence will guarantee not only that the judge is disinterested in relation to the parties and the cause, but also that in fulfilling his judicial function, generally as well as individual cases, he is and can be seen to be free of links with others (whether in the executive, or indeed the judiciary, or in outside life) which might, or might be thought to, affect his assessment of the matters entrusted to him."
That passage was cited by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in the Privy Council in Millar v Dickson [2002] 1 WLR 1615, at paragraph 9. Lord Bingham also cited, at paragraph 26, the speech of Lord Steyn in Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681, at page 708C:
". . and it is a basic premise of the Convention system that only an entirely neutral, impartial, and independent judiciary can carry out the primary task of securing and enforcing Convention rights."
Lord Bingham concluded, page 1628A:
"The conduct of trials at all stages by an independent and impartial tribunal is in my view recognised by the Convention and the authorities, subject to waiver where that is permissible, as a necessary although not a sufficient safeguard of the citizen's right to a fair trial. It is a safeguard which should not, least of all in the criminal field, be weakened or diluted, whatever the administrative consequences."”
Further - in paragraph 65, Lord Pill  said,  I do, however, see the combination in Sark of the judicial with the other functions of the Seneschal as inconsistent with the Article 6 requirement to establish by law an independent and impartial tribunal.”

And in paragraph 66, Lord Pill  said, “Sark appears to have been fortunate, in recent years, in not having had substantial litigation, either civil or criminal, but while it seeks to maintain a separate system for the administration of justice, as the Reform Law does, the safeguards for independence and impartiality required by Article 6 must be provided. That includes a consideration of appearances. A judge independent of the legislature and executive is in my judgment required even for the comparatively modest litigation described in the Seneschal's diary.”
And in paragraph 68, Lord Pill said, “The law must provide a structure in which those who do, or who may, come before the court can be confident in the independence and impartiality of the judge.”

The third of the Court of Appeal judges who heard the case was Lord Justice Etherton, who made an important contribution to the judgment when, at paragraph 161, he said:
“A litigant cannot be expected to know whether the Seneschal has been involved in a process within the Chief Pleas which, whether in relation to legislation or an executive matter, might have some direct or indirect bearing on the subject matter of the proceedings. The reasonable assumption would be that the Seneschal probably had been, or at least might well have been, so involved, but the litigant cannot reasonably be expected to have researched and discovered any such involvement. Accordingly, in every case, so far as the litigant is concerned, there exists a possibility of lack of independence and impartiality by the Seneschal acting in a judicial capacity. In view of the inevitably limited knowledge of the litigant about the involvement of the Seneschal in the Chief Pleas on any particular occasion or matter, the problem is not resolved by rights of appeal or judicial review. For those reasons, I consider that the Reform Law gives rise to a violation of Article 6.”
It is worthy of note that the appeal-court judges on that occasion – and the arguments generally – largely focused on what might be termed a “theoretical” consideration of the “possibility” of the Seneschal – in some hypothetical future situation – not being able to meet the test of the appearance of objectivity in the judicial capacity, in the eyes of members of the public, because of his role in the legislature. There was also some discussion of the possibility – the possibility only – that the Seneschal might be politically – and thus judicially – biased against a member of the legislature, should they come before him in his capacity as a judge.
Such mere possibilities – possibilities only, note - with no current examples of any actual such occurrences – were considered more than sufficient grounds for the Court of Appeal to uphold Ground 2 – such is, plainly, the vital importance of the purity of the administration of justice.
Turning to the Jersey judicial function  – the situation would be wholly analogous – save for the fact it is actually worse.
In Jersey the judicial function is  - on unanswerable and extensive evidence - biased and dysfunctional – to the point of undisguised, openly-practised corruption – and direct – express – personally and politically contaminated acts of “judicial” harassment, discrimination and oppression against members of the Jersey legislature.
The failure – the unlawful failure – of the respondent public authorities, the Crown, Privy Council, and Sectary of State to have cured the Jersey system in accordance with their various legal duties and obligations – is so unlawful, it is the tort of misfeasance in a public office. Consider: -
The respondent authorities have known the system was unlawful.
The respondents have known that they had no legal power to act as they have done, to permit the continuance of the unlawful system and its unlawful acts.
The respondents have known that the unlawful acts in question would cause severe harm and losses and damage to people such as this applicant, and similar classes of persons, for example the Pitmans.
The conduct of the respondents - in that regard – even far transcends mere “reckless indifference” which, according to the House of Lords judgments, grounds the tort – and have instead pro-actively participated in the defence and continuance of the unlawful and damaging acts.……” 

“…….Unlike in the USA – where the very highest powers in the land were held accountable by the law – where “the system worked” – as in the Watergate scandal – the true power of the British state and of those individuals working within it at the highest levels, remains unassailable – and hidden in the calculated and cultivated obscurantism of the smoke-and-mirrors of the Privy Council.
The fundamentally problematical arcanery of the Privy Council – ensures that, in any attempt to hold its actions and powers accountable under law, an ordinary litigant is attempting something akin to wrestling with ghosts – in a hall-of-mirrors.
The intrinsically unchallengeable – even unidentifiable and unknowable – problem that is the Privy Council – a kind of mystical fog-bank in the heart of the British  state – was laid-out by Patrick O’Connor QC, in The Constitutional Role of the Privy Council and the Prerogative. (ISBN 978-0-907247-47-0)……”

Friday, 17 May 2013

EXTRACTS FROM ARMAGEDDON: # 2

COMMUNIQUÉS FROM THE APOCALYPSE.

Welcome to Extracts from Armageddon - Communiqués from the Apocalypse # 2 - a re-mix from the actus reus – a mash-up of the mens rea – a selection of the citings!
A random pick-&-mix selection of The Case Against the Crown.

Stuart Syvret
Extracts from Armageddon # 2
“…….The very fact that Le Breton was able to become a Jurat raises the most dramatic questions concerning the very safety - lawfulness – and Article 6 compliance - of the entire Jurat system.
Any system that is so central to the very administration of justice – but yet which fails to employ basic and effective “fit-and-proper-person” tests – is plainly unsafe.

And if the system can recruit such an evidencedly unfit and wholly compromised individual in Le Breton – who is to say the other Jurats are not similarly unfit – and compromised?
The Jurat system is unlawful on the above-grounds alone – even setting aside the other fatal, structural issues.

But it is nothing less than an outrage - and a grossly unlawful failure by the respondent UK authorities to meet their legal obligations to ensure the good administration of justice, and the application of Article 6 of the ECHR – that Le Breton should have been one of the Jurats involved in the case of the Pitmans.
Further – it is another damming indictment of both the competency - and neutrality – of the presiding judge – Commissioner Sir Charles Gray – that he permitted the tribunal to operate on such a catastrophically conflicted basis.

It is axiomatic, that in a tiny community such as Jersey, any judge presiding over a mixed-tribunal should inquire - at the outset - for possible conflicts of interests of members of the court he or she is about to lead. It requires no great – or frankly even any – legal expertise to be familiar with the basic requirement that the administration of justice must be scrupulously impartial and free of contaminations.
It is difficult to know which is more damning of Sir Charles Gray or illustrative of his incompetence – the fact that he (we must assume) made no such inquiry of his fellow tribunal members at the commencement of the case – or that he has remained silent in the face of the subsequent revelations concerning the gross and ultra vires conflicts of interest on the part of the Jurats?

Deputy Trevor Pitman is one of the very few Jersey politicians to have actively worked to try and combat the wretched history of child-protection failure and child-abuse cover-ups in Jersey.

It is nothing less than staggering – a manifest collapse in the proper objective administration of justice – that the child-abuse concealing Jurat John Le Breton should have had any involvement in the Pitmans’ case whatsoever.
It is even more staggering – and one of the plain necessitating factors in this litigation – that this collapse in the Jersey judicial function has been subsequently drawn to the attention of the respondent authorities – the Secretary of State, Crown, and Privy Council – only to receive a brief, pro-forma ‘brush-off’ in what is plainly a calculated gesture of contempt.

The conduct of the respondent authorities in this matter greatly adds to – and amplifies – and further evidences - the clear and unanswerable grounding of the tort of misfeasance in a public office.” 

Thursday, 16 May 2013

EXTRACTS FROM ARMAGEDDON: # 1

COMMUNIQUÉS FROM THE APOCALYPSE.

This is the first in an occasional series of pithy postings drawn from the law-suits being launched against the UK Crown, Privy Council, and Secretary of State for Justice. Those British public authorities – “the respondents” - are responsible for the rule of law, good governance, proper administration of justice, and for human rights, in the British island of Jersey.

They haven’t met those duties.  They’ve helped, supported and shielded the Jersey oligarchy in the maintenance of so much undisguised misfeasance, oppression, criminal brutality and corruption, the island’s actual polity is a criminal enterprise.

So, several overlapping strands of legal challenge are being launched against the respondent UK authorities in the London courts.

Found some of the previous legal postings too long and tedious? Worry not!

Extracts from Armageddon – Communiqués from the Apocalypse – is going to bring you a random selection from the servings - a lucky-dip from the litigation!

Don’t expect this random series of postings to be sequential, or placed in context. I won’t even tell you what sections of the applications they’re taken from; much more fun for readers to speculate.  Some of these posting might only be a couple of paragraphs; I’ll see how the mood takes me.

And henceforth, I’ll be posting an Extract from Armageddon at least once-a-day – until, that is, the Jersey mafia jail me.

Again.

Stuart Syvret
 

Extract from Armageddon: # 1

“Even taken on its own – and artificially viewed as though it were a distinct, “firewalled” apparatus, thoroughly insulated from the political and executive realms, as the judicial function is in the UK – the gross judicial conflicts of interest on display in the Pitmans’ hearing, and the failures to declare them, and the management of these matters by the presiding judge, and then the failure of the head of the island’s judiciary to act on the subsequent complaints – is an un-disguisable collapse in the lawful administration of justice.

But – and further to the ultra vires failures of the respondent Crown, Privy Council, and Secretary of State - this matter is dramatically amplified in the Jersey context – given the plain, unarguable, politicised and non-Article 6 compliant nature of the judicial apparatus, and its day-to-day involvement in legislative and executive matters. The Crown-empowered – and appointed – judicial function in Jersey is – overtly – Political.

Indeed – the documented examples of overt and undisguised politicisation on the part of the Jersey judiciary are too extensive to list. But for example, the absolutely regular and unlawful interference by successive Bailiffs and Deputy Bailiffs – including Philip Bailhache, Frances Hamon, Michael Birt and William Bailhache – with opposition members tabling of questions, amendments, propositions, reports,  and the obstruction of their statements. Similar nakedly political and biased interference is evidenced, and there to be observed in virtually every States assembly meeting…….”


 
“…….Bailiff Sir Philip Bailhache also illegally prevented the publication of this applicant’s Official Comments Report, which I had prepared for tabling in response to the illegal conspiracy to obstruct me, and remove me from Office as Health & Social Services Minister so as to prevent me from lawfully discharging the legal requirements of the Children (Jersey) Law 2002.  The criminal conspiracy in question is witnessed by the former Police Chief Graham Power, QPM.
That one example alone, is illustrative of the “functional psychopathy” of the present Jersey system. No legitimate – nor, frankly, even any formally purported – power exists on the part of Bailiffs or Deputy Bailiffs to edit and censor what members of the Jersey legislature may write and publish in reports to that legislature. Yet – Sir Philip Bailhache – exclusively and unassailably empowered by Her Majesty's Letters Patent – did just that – even though – even though – he himself was directly and expressly conflicted in the matters at hand.

Such conduct and behaviour is simply beyond invention.

Yet – there it is.

Able to be engaged in – under the unaccountable – and wholly unassailable power - of Her Majesty’s executive conferral of Letters Patent……”



 “…….The conduct of current Bailiff Michael Birt – solely empowered by Her Majesty’s Letters Patent - is not one scrap less Political or unlawful.
Birt has – and continues to – mount interference after interference – obstruction after obstruction – in the path of opposition members of the legislature. Indeed – it is something that can only become known and understood after a long exposure to Jersey potentates such as the Bailhache brothers and Michael Birt, who are the beneficiaries of upper-middle-class educations, and thus seem extremely plausible when observed causally or engaged in conversation – but all of these people are startlingly ignorant when one scratches below the surface.

They genuinely appear not to have even the first – real – understanding of the proper  and necessary  requirements of functional democracy. They seem to actually believe that it is lawful and right – for them to take partisan positions in politics – and to interfere with – and obstruct – opposition members……”


“……..In general terms – there is no indication, in the conduct of the Crown Officers and judiciary in Jersey that they have any grasp of such concepts as the ultra vires nature of conflicts of interest – nor any understanding of the vital public importance of the role of checks-and-balances – nor of any grasp of the purposes of a separation-of-powers.
 
It is entirely plausible to imagine the Jersey judiciary being handed copies of The Rule of Law, written by the late Tom Bingham, and them fumbling, mystified at it, as though it were some wholly alien text from ancient outer-Mongolia.

And it does not end.

To cite a current wretched and despicable example – the present Bailiff Michael Birt has – predictably – adopted an wholly partisan position in supporting the Jersey Dean Robert Key, even though that man failed disastrously in a safeguarding case of a vulnerable young woman who had been sexually harassed by a church-warden. Indeed – that episode saw the unwell and poor and deeply distressed young woman being subjected to sudden arrest at her home, jailed – and held for two weeks - before actual formal written statements of criminal complaint had been received - hauled before the disgusting and morally rotten excuse for a “judiciary” in Jersey – where she was told she would remain imprisoned unless “agreeing” to be deported. She was then put on a plane and flown to England – and dumped there in destitution: “problem solved.”

Michael Birt – London-appointed Bailiff and chief judge in Jersey – when exercising the plainly legally absurd power of chairing the Jersey legislature – led a highly politically partisan “welcome” to the Dean Robert Key when he resumed his UK-appointed seat in the chamber.
 
That spectacle – and others like it – are so disturbingly bizarre – are so wholly at variance with even the rudiments – or even any thin pretence – at neutrality and objectivity, frankly questions have to be raised concerning the mental fitness of Michael Birt. He actually appears to be living (as do the Bailhache brothers) in some kind of hallucinatory realm coloured in the shades and spectres of a mediaeval fiefdom.

The point is serious. The personal fitness and actual capacity – or otherwise – of Crown-appointed judges to in fact deliver professional and competent judicial services, is the responsibility and liability of the appointing-authority. There is zero indication in the available evidence that the appointing – respondent – authorities have exercised any such due-diligence since they removed from Office one of their previous appointees, a former Deputy Bailiff Vernon Tomes.
It appears not to have occurred to Michael Birt that the matters involving the evidenced failure in office of the Dean might – in one form or another – come before Jersey’s courts – come before Birt himself – or unavoidably, judges chosen and appointed by him.

Thus – at a stroke – Michael Birt has rendered the entire Jersey judicial apparatus structurally – systemically – now incapable of ever dealing lawfully with any matter that arises from the case of the Dean, the safeguarding failures and the subsequent further unlawful abuse of the victim by the Jersey criminal “justice” system.

That such structural – and self-inflicted case-specific – ultra-vires non-existence of a judicial function in Jersey repeatedly manifests itself, is another unanswerable and damming unlawful failure by the Crown, Privy Council, and Secretary of State.……”


“…….It is clear enough – for all kinds of reasons – that what passes for a judicial function in Jersey is simply unlawful and wholly dysfunctional. But the situation is not even as good as that.

Plainly – the judicial function in Jersey has collapsed - and is in a state of roiling anarchy and lawless chaos.

The emperors have no clothes.


It simply isn’t disguisable any more.”

Monday, 22 April 2013

“LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION”, ADMINISTRATIVE POSTURING, AND SOCK-PUPPETS

“The 2010 “review” of the Crown Dependencies by the Justice Select Committee – and the consequent response by the Ministry of Justice - can be cited as a telling and striking example of just such a “waltz” through the predictable, yet ultimately vacuous tropes of idle administrative  posturing.”

As things seem fairly quite at the moment, I thought readers (the good guys at least) might find this section from the imminent London legal action entertaining.

Stuart Syvret  
(What follows is a Section from “Combined Legal Application – Stuart Syvret vs. Monarch, Crown, Privy Council, Secretary of State for Justice, & United Kingdom Attorney General”) 

The Crown Dependency of Jersey: Recent Scrutiny – and Recent Policy Statements - by the United Kingdom

“Legitimate Expectation”.


1.     This part of the application considers what are the most recent and up-to-date examples of scrutiny, and of policy statements by the United Kingdom authorities in respect of UK government, Crown and Privy Council responsibility for the Crown Dependencies.

2.     This part of the application introduces the “legitimate expectation” arising – and the general background “conduct”  of the respondent authorities  - towards the applicant and other members of the public, in light of the public, policy statements and commitments made by the relevant UK authorities.

Legal Relevancy:

3.     Judicial review case-law tends to the position that such tests as Wednesbury unreasonableness, procedural unfairness and substantial unfairness are more weighty causes-of-action against a public authority than “legitimate expectation” on its own – nevertheless, such is the startling and repeated breach by the defendant authorities of their own, declared, published policies – that the arising breaches of legitimate expectation deserve a particular focus.

4.     This is not to say that procedural unfairness, substantive unfairness, Wednesbury unreasonableness – and other causes - are not founded in this case – they most certainly are, and are argued separately.  

5.     But such is the startling failure of the defendant public authorities to adhere to, and to carry-out their own declared, published policies, the court must examine the conduct in question.

6.     Firstly – let it be clear what the relevant, declared, published policy is.

7.     In addition to the established constitutional position – and various historic precedents for intervention by the United Kingdom to ensure good governance, the proper rule of law and good administration of justice in Jersey – none of which decisions and actions and powers have been nullified by subsequent changes in law or policy – the most recent, written policy is to be found in the  “Government Response to the Justice Select Committee’s Report: Crown Dependencies”, published in November 2010 (copy supplied), and – expressly – a Foreword to that document by the Secretary of State for Justice.

8.     Indeed, the Introduction to the said document unambiguously states, “The Government’s view of the current position is set out in the Ministerial foreword to this document.”

9.     Especially noteworthy and relevant from that Foreword are the following passages: -

a.     “Relationships with the Islands are the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government as a whole. The Ministry of Justice holds the policy responsibility for the constitutional relationship but all departments should be engaging routinely with the Crown Dependencies where appropriate to their policy responsibilities.”

And: -  

b.     “The United Kingdom Government has a responsibility to ensure that the Crown Dependencies have the advice and assistance necessary to function as socially and economically sound democracies.”

And: -

c.      “The United Kingdom respects each Crown Dependency’s laws and policies as the expression of the will of a democratic government with the power of self-determination. The UK government is responsible for the Crown Dependences’ international relations and ultimate good governance and has the commensurate power to ensure these obligations are met.”

10.                        Thus politically – and in the context of this application to court and the invoked legal principles in particular – there can be zero credible dispute to a core contention and position that the defendant public authorities do, in fact, have the responsibilities and powers in question. The defendant Secretary of State for Justice declares so in current, published policy.

11.                        Before going on to address, in the next section, what that policy requires – and how the relevant authorities have failed to honour it – it is useful to lay-out some observations concerning what might be termed the general structure, methods and habits by which the United Kingdom goes-through-the-motions of examining the conduct of the Crown Dependencies, and the UK’s arising obligations to the residents thereof. For such customary examinations as do take place – for example, that of the Justice Select Committee, and subsequent departmental responses – are invariably defective and woefully inadequate.

12.                        The findings of the Justice Select Committee are, of course, the work of a parliamentary body, working under parliamentary privilege, and it has no executive power or responsibility.  This application makes no challenge to the right and power of the Committee to find as it sees fit.

13.                        However – the application has a perfect right to state plainly when that Committee has clearly got it wrong – and come to erroneous conclusions which are simply not remotely compatible with the reality-on-the-ground in respect of the actual conduct of the insular authorities in the Crown Dependency of Jersey.

14.                        It goes without saying that this application is directed against those public authorities with executive power and responsibility for the matters at hand. Nevertheless, as those authorities will attempt to claim some form of justification for their failures because of the failure of the Select Committee to highlight the serious problems, that defective scrutiny process deserves some description.

15.                        When scrutinising the words of the United Kingdom authorities when it comes to issues of good governance and the proper rule of law in the Crown Dependencies, it is very difficult to escape the conclusion that some form of charade is being engaged in; that boxes-are-being-ticked – motions-gone-through – and words being spoken and written to fulfil certain “appearances” – without there ever being any serious intent by, say the Crown, Privy Council or the Ministry of Justice, that they would be held to the principles and policies they espouse, or that they would be expected to take action upon them.

16.                        In the case of Jersey, that impression has been solidly built-up on the basis of at least three decades of fine words that say one thing – contrasted with acts and omissions (which this claim argues are ultra vires) that do the other.

17.                        The 2010 “review” of the Crown Dependencies by the Justice Select Committee – and the consequent response by the Ministry of Justice can be cited as a telling and striking example of just such a “waltz” through the predictable, yet ultimately vacuous tropes of idle administrative  posturing.

18.                        Some parts of the 2010 Justice Select Committee report are so protective of the status quo and the power of the local potentates in Jersey – they could have been written by the Chairman of the Policy & Resources Committee of the City of London Corporation, and that syndicate’s “Remembrancer”. Indeed, perhaps they were? That is not a flippant speculation.

19.                        Yet another “review” – by the Justice Select Committee has been announced. This bears all the hall-marks of panic, given the increasingly undisguisable breakdown in the basic rule-of-law in Jersey – for example, the frank abandonment of even any pretence that the prosecution function - or judiciary - in Jersey are anything other than party-political protection-rackets. The review will go through yet another “polite” and “plausible” exercise – in order to produce yet another cloak of “respectability” behind which the rampant Crown corruption in Jersey can be hidden and the attendant ultra vires inactions and failures of the Ministry of Justice can be excused.

20.                        Consider, for example, the requirements imposed by the Select Committee on written submissions and accompanying evidence. According to the web site of the Justice Select Committee, submissions should “be about 3,000 words in length / run to no more than six sides of A4 paper” – and – “as far as possible comprise a single document attachment to the email”.  Those conditions exclude – just by way of one, single example – the submission of the 94 page interim statement of the former Jersey Police Chief Graham Power, Queens Police Medal – a man who was illegally suspended by a conspiracy involving the corrupt Jersey (but London-appointed) Attorney General, corrupt subordinate police officers, corrupt Jersey politicians and corrupt judges.

21.                        How the latest review by the Select Committee will go is entirely predictable. A few token “rebellious” submissions will be made – a few opponents of the corruption of the Jersey polity will be entertained at public hearings where they will give live evidence as witnesses – some token acknowledgment of such concerns will be expressed by the Committee – but the vast majority of written and witness submissions will be from professional “Men In Suits” – who will espouse just how fine the “ancient privileges of the Crown Dependencies” are – how “the current arrangement matches the interests of the United Kingdom” – and how “everything in the garden is rosy in terms of good governance and justice in a place like Jersey” – and “even if it wasn’t, why, then the Justice Secretary could intervene.”

22.                        And that will be that.

23.                        Another cosmetic exercise – will have succeeded in doing what such exercises always do – namely, manufacturing a “clean-bill-of-health” and a “justification” for non-intervention.

24.                        The modus operandi of the Justice Select Committee is not that of a body remotely seriously interested in genuinely inquiring into dramatic and evidenced matters concerning breakdowns in good governance and even the basic rule of law in the Crown Dependency of Jersey – and the attendant plain failure of the relevant UK authorities to prevent such criminality and decadence.

25.                        However – the legal reality of the United Kingdom’s constitutional responsibilities - and the startlingly disingenuous nature of how those responsibilities are dodged - is becoming increasingly obvious to observers around the world.

26.                        In the book, Treasure Islands, Tax Havens and the Men Who Stole the World, (ISBN 97818 4792 1109) Nicholas Shaxson writes (page 17, paragraph 3):

a.     “Britian’s understated but controlling role is the bedrock that reassures flighty global capital and underpins the overseas territories offshore sectors. The gesture towards local representation keeps Caymanians happy, and as with the Crown Dependencies, affords Britain the chance to say, “It’s not our business to interfere” when something unpleasant breaks the surface. Periodically, the charade is exposed. In August 2009 Britain imposed direct rule on the Turks & Caicos islands after corruption there spun out of control. Britain plays down these episodes as much as possible, to distract from its control.”

27.                        The corruption that is rampant in the Jersey polity is - evidencedly – worse – dramatically so – than the corruption in the Turks & Caicos islands. Indeed – this was – frankly the evidenced case by 2009 – when the Justice Select Committee decided to undertake its previous review.

28.                        Yet that review and the response of the government was the predicable “gentlemen’s club” confection. But – for all those defects – this application cites and uses the response of the Ministry of Justice – and does so because that response still embodies the traditional acknowledgment of ultimate responsibility for good governance in the Crown Dependencies such as Jersey – and this application is going to – finally – hold the UK to its words.

29.                        For this is an important point – even though the Select Committee plainly – and on the evidence – got things wrong in certain respects – those errors do not prevent the Committee – nor the Ministry of Justice – both coming to, and agreeing with, the ultimate conclusion that the United Kingdom is responsible for good governance, the rule of law and good administration of justice in the Crown Dependencies, and the overarching responsibility of the United Kingdom for adherence to international treaties; for example, the European Convention on Human Rights.

30.                        Remember these words from the Foreword by the Secretary of State for Justice:

a.     “The UK government is responsible for the Crown Dependences’ international relations and ultimate good governance and has the commensurate power to ensure these obligations are met.”

31.                        But, of course, whilst that ultimate constitutional and legal responsibility of the UK government is found – and agreed – by both the Select Committee – and the Secretary of State – another commonality of ground between both of those parties is that “no intervention is presently required, because – yes, whilst hypothetically possible that things could go very badly wrong in a Crown Dependency – they haven’t done so – so at the moment, everything in the garden is rosy.”

32.                        This application will, in due course, move on – from the general constitutional and legal position as arrived at by those UK agencies – with which the application agrees – to the particular – concerning the standards of governance, justice, law-enforcement and human rights in the Crown Dependency of Jersey, as claimed by those UK agencies – with which this application does not agree.

33.                        To illustrate the mutually-beneficial, tacit, “everything-in-the-garden-is-rosy” cosmetic consensus propounded by the Select Committee, Secretary of State and the Jersey oligarchy, it is useful to cite this paragraph from the Introduction to the government response – and note most carefully two fundamental – and telling  - omissions: -

a.     “The Government accepts the Committee’s advice that the Ministry of Justice should restrain itself from engaging in areas of work which do not directly concern its primary constitutional role. This is entirely in line with the way the Crown Dependencies should be viewed – as self-determining jurisdictions with sufficient autonomy and expertise to engage the UK Government as they feel appropriate. This report explicitly recognises this and sets out steps to facilitate the necessary transition in ways of working. The Ministry of Justice believes this change of policy will have the additional benefit of making best use of the resource available.”

34.                        A casual reader of that paragraph – which represents a cosy and ‘happy’ PR ‘front’ that each of the three parties – Secretary of State, Jersey and Committee – can sign-up to with mutually comfortable avoidance of controversy – would never know that the Secretary of State and Crown’s position is both ultra vires – and vastly more directly involved and responsible.

35.                        The quoted paragraph fails to recognise that: -

36.                        A public authority may not – in law – “abdicate” its powers – nor allow its authority and power to be “puppeteered” or “ventriloquised”;  

37.                        The key Offices in Jersey – the very powers that should be most relied upon to ensure good governance, rule of law and good administration of justice – but which are – on the evidence – at the heart of the collapse thereof and involved in rampant corruption and political oppression – are, in fact, not local, Jersey authorities – but are - actually - the expressly and directly appointed agents of the Crown, and of London itself.

38.                        The fact is the UK Justice Department (like the Home Office before it) and the Privy Council have allowed themselves to become “captured” by the Jersey establishment over the decades. Resources – such as funding, staff and secondments flow from the Jersey oligarchy – into the Justice Department and the “Crown Dependencies section” and other parts of Whitehall - and a variety of personal and professional entanglements and contaminations have been allowed to flourish which – structurally – render the relevant United Kingdom authorities – such as the Secretary of State, Privy Council and the Jersey-based Lieutenant Governor – not capable of discharging their powers as  “public authorities” on an objective, exclusive basis – because – “discretionary decisions” and “powers” that should be exercised exclusively by the lawfully empowered authorities in question, are being dramatically influenced and – de facto - made by external – conflicted – agencies.

39.                        Indeed – it is quite remarkable – startling even - in a way that raises the question whether, in fact, anyone involved at the Department of Justice, and Privy Council, actually understands even the rudiments of settled administrative law – that the government Response document freely admits – even boasts – of its ultra vires “abdication” of power and exclusive authority.

40.                        Consider the following passages taken from that document, which are hereby cited as evidence: -

a.     The Ministry of Justice agrees some clarification on the practical application of this relationship would be helpful. The Ministerial foreword to this response answers the Committee’s recommendation that we produce a simple account of the constitutional position. We intend it to provide a blueprint for UK engagement with the Crown Dependencies and to bolster the recognition of their separate identities. We agree that secondments by Crown Dependencies staff to central Government Departments could bring benefits in terms of increased mutual understanding and would be happy to help facilitate these.

And: -

b.     “However, it is to be hoped that increased opportunity for the Crown Dependencies to build relationships across Whitehall will raise the capacity of both Government Departments and the Crown Dependencies to engage effectively on issues like this.”

And: -

c.      The Ministry of Justice envisages a period of transition from the current way of working to the new which will involve both awareness raising in other Government Departments and supporting the Crown Dependencies in developing an engagement strategy. Lord McNally will be writing to all Government Departments to draw their attention to this response and remind them of their responsibilities regarding the Crown Dependencies. The Ministry of Justice will also be exploring a range of ways to disseminate this information at official level”.

And: -

d.    “The Ministry of Justice recognises its responsibility, on behalf of the Crown, to ensure good governance in all the Crown Dependencies. We will continue to keep a watching brief on all relevant matters and maintain our strong relationships with the Islands that will help enable us to resolve any problems which may arise in a collaborative way. We will provide advice and support to the government and Chief Pleas of Sark as the new democratic government matures.”

And: -  

e.      “We accept the Committee’s view that this can, on occasion, amount to a duplication of effort with both the Islands’ Law Officers and UK Officials undertaking a similar analysis. We consider that if the Islands’ Law Officers provided a detailed report of their analysis of a Law and how it might touch upon international or constitutional issues then the need for such questioning from the Ministry of Justice would be substantially reduced and could be restricted to specific triggers, for example any Laws concerned with the constitutional relationship, or which had significant international considerations – for example significant risks of challenge under the ECHR, EU law or other international obligations. It should be noted that this change, whilst generally more efficient for both the UK and the Islands, may require the Island’s Law Officers to commit more resource to this process, although we would expect that the analysis which would go to such a report is already carried out by the Islands’ Law Officers. We will work with the Crown Dependencies Law Officers to put an appropriate procedure in place.

f.      While the Ministry of Justice would expect to be in a position to submit for approval for Royal Assent any Law which received a satisfactory report from the Islands’ Law Officers, the Ministry of Justice wishes to make it clear that changes to this process would not affect the constitutional right of the UK to refuse to recommend for Royal Assent a Law which the UK considered should not be so approved.”

And: -

g.     “We are confident that the guidance currently being developed between the Crown Dependency Law Officers and the Ministry of Justice will clarify and improve arrangements for handling Crown Dependency legislation. We are grateful for the constructive engagement by the Attorneys General of the Crown Dependencies in the next drafting stage of a revised set of guidance for the scrutiny of insular legislation. The new guidance should, as the Committee suggests, set out with clarity the means by which the UK's responsibilities for insular legislation may be discharged; the constitutional grounds on which insular legislation may be challenged; the responsibilities of ministers and officials at each stage of the scrutiny process; and appropriate time limits for processing legislation prior to Royal Assent.”

41.                        There is another - fundamentally important – factor, not mentioned in the government response – but which reflects precisely the same type of “capture” and of “clientism” we see expressed in the above policy-statements – and that is the position and role of the Crown’s Lieutenant Governor in Jersey.

42.                        Ostensibly, the Lieutenant Governor is the agent of the Crown – the monarch – empowered by her Majesty’s personal Letters Patent, to independently represent Crown interest and the general interest of her Majesty’s subjects in Jersey.

43.                        When considering the labyrinthine and obscure networks of contacts, relationships and communications between Jersey and the United Kingdom authorities – of all of the agencies that most needs to be independent of – and sceptical towards the Jersey potentates – and healthily at arm’s-length – it is the Lieutenant Governor and his Offices.

44.                        Instead – that Office has become wholly captured – indeed, even apparently corrupted – by the Jersey establishment – and has been perverted from the oversight role it should be exercising – and bent to the complete opposite role – namely a champion of, a defender of, a “fixer” for – the Jersey oligarchy.

45.                        This ultra vires “clientism” and “abdication” of power by the relevant UK authorities is to be seen in the fact that the Office of Lieutenant Governor – Office-holder and staff – are actually funded by Jersey. Further – and quite extraordinarily – the indigenous Jersey potentates have had ceded to them, by the Crown, the power to de facto choose who the Lieutenant Governors will be, and to veto any they find “unacceptable”.

46.                        That state of affairs – even taken on its own – is so, frankly, extraordinarily ultra vires – one couldn’t make it up.

47.                        Taken in-the-round, it is plain that the position of the Crown, Privy Council and Secretary of State is ultra vires on grounds of “abdication”, “fettering” – and of permitting their powers and responsibilities to be “ventriloquised”  and “puppeteered”.  

48.                        Thus – even if the relevant and various “discretionary decisions” by the defendant authorities were hypothetically “reasonable”  and otherwise “lawful” (which they are not)  – on these grounds alone – that of “abdication”, “fettering”, and being “puppeteered” – the decisions in question are unlawful – and must be set aside by the court.

49.                        The relevant “discretionary decisions” of the “public authorities” in question – must be their decisions – taking into account all relevant – and only relevant – factors. “Discretionary decisions” which are contaminated by third-party actors, and which take into account non-relevant factors – are not lawful decisions.

50.                        The administrative law case-law is decisive – simply crushing.

51.                        If we are to choose a single, short description – which accurately captures the nature of the relationship between Jersey’s entrenched and overtly stagnant oligarchy – and the United Kingdom authorities – the word “clientism” captures the situation most economically. “Clientism” is the tendency of resident in-country staff of an organisation to regard the officials and people of the host country as "clients". This condition can be found in business or government. The term clientism is somewhat similar to the phrase "gone-native".

52.                        The Crown, Privy Council and Secretary of State for Justice – and their agents, for example the Lieutenant Governors - have “gone-native” – and regard the Jersey establishment and their allies in the City as “clients” – rather than what they, in plain reality, are - a corrupt, self-protecting, overly-powerful and frankly dangerous set of backwoods and faintly crazed oligarchs who require – in the name of the public-good - the most rigorous scrutiny and challenge.

53.                        On a day-to-day basis – and in occasional official policy statements such as the 2010 government response to the Justice Select Committee – we are sold an image of a dialogue – a relationship - between two separate, independent, authorities – the Secretary of State for justice – and the insular authorities of Jersey.

54.                        That image is false.

55.                        It is deliberately cosmetic.

56.                        That being so – how might we, then, accurately perceive the true nature of what we see?

57.                        The Jersey oligarchs are wholly entrenched in the corridors of power in London – such is their degree of “capture” of the London authorities, such as the Lieutenant Governor and Crown Dependencies Section of the MoJ. Thus the image of the relevant UK authorities as meaningfully “independent” of Jersey mafia interests is legally fictitious.

58.                        But – the fiction flows in the other direction too.

59.                        London is swift enough to always describe the Jersey establishment as the “insular authorities” – and as an “independent”, “self-determining” entity – thus bolstering the view that any intervention would be some form of monstrous, colonial imposition.

60.                        But who are the real powers in Jersey – who have manifested the catalogue of misfeasances, negligences, malfeasances, political oppressions and undisguised corruptions? Those are Crown Office holders – Lieutenant Governor, Bailiff, Deputy Bailiff, Attorney General and Solicitor General – and all are creatures of – agents of – London. All are appointed – and dramatically and unassailably empowered – by her Majesty’s Letters Patent. Not one of the immensely powerful Office Holders in question is answerable to any entity in Jersey – at all.

61.                        So – in fact – the “insular authorities” – are, in reality - the London authorities.

62.                        Returning to the question – “what, then is the true nature of the “relationship” and “dialogue” we see between the Secretary of State and the Jersey potentates?”

63.                        It is this: – imagine a man with a sock-puppet on either hand – and pretending that each puppet is engaging the other in a conversation. In our analogue – the sock-puppet on one hand is the Secretary of State – and the sock-puppet on the other hand is the Jersey Law Officers.

64.                        The puppeteer conducting this charade – is the Privy Council.
 
[Section from Combined Legal Application – Stuart Syvret vs. Monarch, Crown, Privy Council, Secretary of State for Justice, & United Kingdom Attorney General.]